PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF ECUADOR
FACULTY OF COMMUNICATION, LINGUISTICS, AND LITERATURE
MULTILINGUAL SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THESIS PAPER PRIOR TO OBTAINING THE MULTILINGUAL DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Lord's Resistance Army: A story of violence in North Central Africa (1987-2018)

MARIA JOSE SANTAMARIA ESCOBAR

Director:
Mgt. Paola Lozada

AUGUST, 2021
QUITO – ECUADOR

To the greatest humans to ever live,

my mom ***Paty*** *and dad* ***Lu***

for having hope in me when I did not and being the ones that pushed me to stay alive.

Thank you, this is all because of you.

My love for you knows no limits.

To my sisters ***Lore*** *and* ***Belen*** *for being my best friends and help me all the way,*

you are my inspiration.

To ***Teo, Tita*** *and* ***Nina****, never give up, shine as much as you can,*

You have the potential to change the world.

You three are my everything.

To all the children in Uganda that were not allowed to be children

You will never be invisible again.

Rest in power

Acknowledgments

To all my friends and family, you have helped me get here. My infinite gratitude.

To Nicky and Oscar, you have been through my lowest lows and my highest highs, this would not have been possible without your ongoing help, love, and support.

To Vere and Vale, my university path would not have been the same without you, thank you for being the best of classmates, but also the best of friends, you two are the best thing that college gave me.

To my professors that led my way, but most importantly to my thesis director, Paola Lozada, thank you for all your knowledge and support, you truly are an inspiration to me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Topic: 1

II. ABSTRACT 1

III. RESUMEN 2

IV. RÉSUMÉ 3

V. Introduction ……..……4

CHAPTER ONE 9

1 Theorization of Constructivism, terrorism, and human rights 9

Introduction 9

1.1 Constructivism as a social theory 9

1.1.1 Identity-Agents 10

1.1.2 Structures-Environment 13

1.1.3 Positions, rules, and relationships 16

1.2 Terrorism 20

1.2.1 Terrorism, according to Alex Schmid 20

1.3 Human Rights 24

1.3.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 24

CHAPTER TWO 27

2 Uganda 27

2.1 British protectorate and Ugandan independence: roots of the division (1962)... 28
2.1.1 British protectorate in the territory 28
2.1.2 Process of Independence: Obote and the role of the north 35
2.2 The end of the relative peace in Uganda 37
2.2.1 Idi Amin, dictator, and general bloodshed 38
2.2.2 Obote II: the final gap breaches with the Ugandan Bush War 43
2.2.3 Yosef Museveni: the end of the peace with the north 46
2.3 Lord's Resistance Army 48
2.3.1 Creation of the Lord's Resistance Army 48
CHAPTER THREE 54
3 LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY: TERROR OF THE SOCIETY 54
3.1 The Lord's Resistance Army illegal and violent doing 54
3.1.1 LRA's intervention in the Sudanese conflict 55
3.1.2 The Nairobi Agreements between Sudan and Uganda 57
3.2 LRA shift from a guerrilla to a terrorist group. 58
3.2.1 LRA expansion to the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic 59
3.2.2 The Lord's Resistance Army and the International Criminal Court 72
3.2.3 International regards on the LRA 75
3.3 The LRA and the consequences of decades of violence 80

VI. Analysis……...83

VII. Conclusions……90

VIII. Recommendations…….94

IX. List of Reference……..96

TABLE INDEX

Table #1

Ethnic Groups and Tribes in Uganda……...….29

Table #2

Techniques of violence used in terrorism in comparison with the ones used by the Lord's Resistance Army……..66

Table #3

Joseph Kony's crimes indicted by the ICC……..….73

FIGURE INDEX

Figure #1

The cycle of influences under Constructivism……..…….19

Figure #2

Ethnic map of Uganda…….……..28

List of Acronyms

AU- African Union

CAR- Central African Republic

DDR- Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo

EU- European Union

FRONASA- Front for National Salvation

GoS- Government of Sudan

GoU- Government of Uganda

HSM- Holy Spirit Movement

ICC- International Criminal Court

IDP- Internally Displaced People

LRA- Lord's Resistance Army

NRA- National Resistance Army

RCI-LRA- Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army

SPLA- Sudanese People Liberation Army

SUM-Save Uganda Movement

TPDF- Tanzania People's Defense Force

UN- United Nations

UNCTC- United Nations Counter-Terrorism Center

UNLF/A- Ugandan National Liberation Front/Army

UPDF- Ugandan People's Defense Forces

US- United States

I. Topic:

Lord's Resistance Army: A story of violence in North Central Africa (1987-2018)

II. ABSTRACT

The following dissertation paper follows the armed organization Lord's Resistance Army of Uganda to learn if this group can be classified as a terrorist group resulting from a deconstructed identity from a defense group. For this purpose, this research starts from the modern beginnings of Uganda to suggest the relation of this country with the creation of said group. This investigation is based on the Constructivism theory of Onuf, Wendt, Ruggie, and Reus-Smit to set the formation and progress of concepts such as identity, structures, interests, and their role in our actions. This paper was developed with a qualitative historical, descriptive approach with a non-probabilistic sampling, which helped us figure out that this group was indeed created because of this country's past. Throughout the years, the group's character changed to a terrorist organization because of the subsistence of the leaders and the group itself. This dissertation suggests that the LRA are terrorists since the beginning of the 21st century, under Alex Schmid's terrorism, because of the psychological message of terror they sent to the governments and populations since then.

Keywords:

Lord's Resistance Army, LRA, Constructivism, Joseph Kony, terrorism, Uganda, Sudan, Schmid, Onuf, Wendt, Ruggie, Reus-Smit, history, Schmid.

III. RESUMEN

El siguiente trabajo de tesis sigue a la organización armada Lord's Resistance Army de Uganda para saber si este grupo puede ser clasificado como un grupo terrorista como resultado de una identidad deconstruida de un grupo de defensa. Para ello, esta investigación parte de los inicios modernos de Uganda para sugerir la relación de este país con la creación de dicho grupo. Esta investigación se basa en la teoría del constructivismo de Onuf, Wendt, Ruggie y Reus-Smit para establecer la formación y el progreso de conceptos como identidad, estructuras, intereses y su papel en nuestras acciones. Este trabajo se desarrolló con un enfoque histórico cualitativo, descriptivo y con un muestreo no probabilístico, que nos ayudó a averiguar que este grupo se creó, efectivamente, por el pasado de este país. A lo largo de los años, el carácter del grupo cambió a una organización terrorista debido a la subsistencia de los líderes y del propio grupo. Esta disertación sugiere que el LRA es terrorista desde principios del siglo XXI, bajo el terrorismo de Alex Schmid, debido al mensaje psicológico de terror que enviaron a los gobiernos y a las poblaciones desde entonces.

Palabras claves:

Lord's Resistance Army, LRA, Constructivismo, Joseph Kony, terrorismo, Uganda, Sudán, Schmid, Onuf, Wendt, Ruggie, Reus-Smit, historia.

IV. RÉSUMÉ

Ce document de dissertation suit l'organisation armée Lord's Resistance Army de l'Ouganda pour savoir si ce groupe peut être classé comme un groupe terroriste résultant d'une identité déconstruite d'un groupe de défense. Pour ce faire, cette recherche part des débuts modernes de l'Ouganda pour suggérer la relation de ce pays avec la création dudit groupe. Cette enquête est basée sur la théorie du Constructivisme de Onuf, Wendt, Ruggie, et Reus-Smit pour établir la formation et le progrès de concepts tels que l'identité, les structures, les intérêts, et leur rôle dans nos actions. Ce document a été élaboré à l'aide d'une approche qualitative, historique et descriptive avec un échantillonnage non probabiliste, ce qui nous a permis de comprendre que ce groupe a effectivement été créé en raison du passé de ce pays. Au fil des années, le caractère du groupe s'est transformé en une organisation terroriste en raison de la subsistance des dirigeants et du groupe lui-même. Cette thèse suggère que la LRA est une organisation terroriste depuis le début du 21ème siècle, sous le terrorisme d'Alex Schmid, en raison du message psychologique de terreur qu'elle a envoyé aux gouvernements et aux populations depuis lors.

Mots-clés :

Lord’s Resistance Army, LRA, Constructivisme, Joseph Kony, terrorisme, Ouganda, Soudan, Schmid, Onuf, Wendt, Ruggie, Reus-Smit, histoire, Schmid.

V. Introduction

Violence has been a common denominator throughout history; it has been used as a tool of survival or to establish one's dominance over the others; this can be seen in all animal kingdoms. This paper is a story of violence that began in Uganda. The Lord's Resistance Army is an armed group created by Joseph Kony in 1987; however, this dissertation paper goes back in time to study the roots of why this organization was created and how history was the main reason why they exist.

Uganda started as a British protectorate in the early 1900s. The way this land was managed was through violence and the search for their political and economic interests. They saw this territory as an ideal connection for their Indian commerce routes. Since their arrival, the Britons were in charge of managing the colony with no regard whatsoever of what the twenty-eight native tribal groups had to say about it. In their sixty-year administration, they divided the population into two, labor and productive zone. The south has developed greater agronomy, whereas the northerners developed their combat and defensive skills. Henceforth, the northern people became the workforce of the country, working the fields or playing part of the King's Rifles -the soldiers of the British Empire in this land-. That got enhanced during World War II, where Ugandan men -from the north- fought as British soldiers. However, because southern Uganda was more beneficial for the economy, they received more significant benefits for their urban and human development. To this establishment, one must also add the religious missions that came along with the Britons to "humanize" the native people. Four different religions went to separate tribes, and they were the ones in charge of the tribes' education.

Uganda got its independence from the British Crown in 1960 with then-Prime Minister Milton Obote, a northerner who would quickly become the first President of this new nation. He was born at the time of colonization; consequently, the only way to precede the country was the one he had been taught, violence. During his eight-year tenure, he gave a free hand to his armed forces, mainly formed by his tribe and allies, the Acholi, who exploited this power against their co-citizens. Subsequently, Idi Amin Dada got to power with the help of some members of the militia that were not in favor of Obote. He perpetuated the same stream of actions as his predecessor, only that the violence was targeted primarily to Obote's tribe and allies. The only way to accurately describe his dictatorship is mayhem. He was in power for nine years until Obote returned for a second administration that was virtually the same as his first government, mistreating the rest of the clans. From 1981, a civil war burst, coined Ugandan Bush War, Milton Obote against Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army. Museveni was back then a southerner middle-rank soldier who could not bear Obote's abuse. Museveni won this dispute and has been in power since then. The first years of his tenure were marked by carnage as well, a never-ending cycle in this land.

One studies Ugandan history because of the consequences it caused and how it shaped the collective identity. In 1987, Joseph Kony, an Acholi member, decided to create an ethnic defense group named the Lord's Resistance Army to protect his people against President Museveni. However, the foundations of this organization were also mixed with religious convictions. Catholic missions were the ones that *educated* the Acholi. Hence, Kony wanted a nation that was based on the Ten Commandments and Catholicism. After some years, they got involved in an international conflict with Sudan and the rebels who wanted an independent territory, South Sudan. The LRA became the right hand of the government of Sudanese President Omar al-

Bashir. This is the same pact that Museveni had with the South Sudan rebels. Then, the LRA changed their objectives of protecting their clan because Khartoum's government offered them means of survival. In the year 2000, the alliance between the GoS and the LRA ended because of an international agreement between the two nations involved, Uganda and Sudan. At this point, the LRA shifts its identity to survive and begins to commit serious and violent crimes.

Thereupon, one has established a hypothesis that the armed group Lord's Resistance Army can be considered a terrorist organization by the fundamental that it has committed crimes against humanity due to a deconstructed identity from an Acholi defense group to an extremist organization. To prove this hypothesis, one will use throughout this dissertation a historical, descriptive methodology.

For the development of this paper, one has determined as the general objective to describe the development and evolution of the Lord's Resistance Army from an ethnic defense group to a terrorist organization from a constructivist perspective. To achieve this goal, one has divided the thesis into three chapters. The first chapter aims to theorize the framework to be applied to the study case; this is separated into Constructivism as a social theory, the definition of terrorism by Alex Schmid, and the Academic Consensus. The final part of this chapter focuses on what are Human Rights.

The second objective of this paper is to identify the historical context prior to the existence of the Lord's Resistance Army and the beginnings of the guerrilla (1962-1988). To achieve this goal, one has split the second chapter into three parts to understand Ugandan history better since this land became a colony and Obote's first administration. The second part of this chapter highlights Idi Amin's government from 1970 until 1979, Obote's second run from 1980-1986, the

Ugandan Bush War up until the beginnings of Yoweri Museveni's presidential trail. The final part of this chapter focuses on Joseph Kony's biography and the first years of the LRA as an ethnic defense group.

The final chapter seeks to establish the Lord's Resistance Army's actions to be considered a terrorist organization (1990-2018). To successfully achieve this goal, one began with the transition of the LRA from a guerrilla to a terrorist organization, stating the difference between one and the other. Later on, one explains in-depth the actions made by the LRA since 2000 to learn if they can qualify as a terrorist organization with the help of Schmid's definition. The last part of this third chapter focuses on the International Criminal Court case against the Lord's Resistance Army leadership. Then one explores different international actors, their definitions of terrorism, and how they have classified this group. One finishes with a brief explanation of the consequences of this group after decades of existence.

To study this topic, one chose the Constructivism theory by authors Nicholas Onuf, Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, and Christian Reus-Smit. This theory centers on the construction of individual and collective identity, interests, and structures that will help us have a better understanding of the Ugandan situation and, later on, why the LRA changed from a defense group to a terrorist organization.

The techniques that one will use to develop this paper are secondary data and documents recollection with a perspective methodology from the earliest events to the latest events to helps us prove or disprove the proposed hypothesis. One will focus its universe on non-probability sampling because it is qualitative research, making this paper theoretical-practical research.

This thesis paper is pertinent to the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador (PUCE) because their goal is to educate professionals with a broad comprehension of the different people's conditions and the functioning of the society while seeking a new society in a fairer world. Their professionals must be aware of the social, political, and economic conditions that impulse us to dismantle the injustices lived by others actively.

Moreover, this topic is relevant for the Multilingual School of International Business and International Relations, whose fundamental pillars are international relations and cultural diversity. Therefore the applicability of this thesis gives us the opportunity to assess international conflicts with a broader and deeper perspective. Furthermore, what is preached as the main objectives of this school program is the have of an equal society, where all of its members have enough opportunities to create a better world; however, if many communities are denied their human rights, we cannot progress.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1 Theorization of Constructivism, terrorism, and human rights

Introduction

The following chapter aims to explain the theoretical framework constitution and its application to the proposed case study. The first chapter comprises three subchapters, the first subchapter being an extensive explanation of what Constructivism is for four prominent authors in the field. The second subchapter is about terrorism, what it is, its fundamental concepts, and what criteria must an organization have to be considered terrorist, which will be applied to evaluate the hypothesis regarding the organization in question -Lord's Resistance Army-. The third subchapter comprises a brief history of human rights and the most influential rights in our case study.

1.1 Constructivism as a social theory

This subchapter aims to explain how Constructivism is built; it has been divided into three sections for a better understanding, the first being Identity–Agents, where it will be spoken about the creation and development of what is identity and what are agents under this theory. The second section Structures-Environment talks about the importance of these agencies in the social realm, its influence, and how it shapes us while we shape it. The final part of the subchapter is named Positions, rules, and relationships; its aims to deepen the knowledge on how the rules and position within a society make people act and how these interactions may change us **or** our roles within a community.

1.1.1 Identity-Agents

Identity is a crucial part when studying Constructivism because it is one of the bases of this theory. When talking about identity, one can refer to a specific person, a community (micro or mid-sized), to a society (national identity) as identity can be studied as a collection of events, choices, traits, among others. That is why Onuf (1989) states that nothing is fixed in our history and our identity. Those can be seen as an empty vessel that fills through history, a puzzle, or in his terms, a paradigm of human practices in changing circumstances (Onuf, 1989).

Onuf fixates that our mentality, perspectives, and even decision-making are socially bounded to what one has been taught and learned systematically. When we take this train of thought to a larger scale in a politically organized territory, all these individual beliefs and practices gather into a society driven by those, consecutively determining another set of choices, ideas, and rules. However, he argues that this establishment is merely a guide rather than a determination of human conduct because this is solely a social concept (Onuf, 1989).

Reus-Smit (1999) explains the importance of the cultural context when talking about identity and interest. It will influence the institutions that the former will create and then try to regulate them under the definition of their principles. When expanding this view from an individual to a community-like size, one can see the significant importance of those interests as they set the national and state action most of the time. The latter will consecutively impact the state's identity and the individuals inside it through the institutions created by the agents at that particular time as the author sees the identity of people and institutions as relational. Reus-Smit (1999) exemplifies this concept with the United States, which is at its *core identity* a liberal democracy. All its agencies and agents will follow this principle when making decisions and creating their policies.

An important concept shared by Reus-Smit (1999) is that of identity values, which is defined as the core of unquestioned values which will shape our perspective and view in every aspect. These will create patterns that will solidify our social identities, which include both individual and collective identities. They are also composed by our internalized nature, social-psychological reasons, and primary purposes as agents, determining the majority of our actions. In his words, Reus-Smit explains: "our identities are our being and acting" (Reus-Smit, 1999).

John Ruggie (1998) further explains that, because each person has their own identity and interests, one cannot expect by any chance that two individuals can be treated the same. Even if they have similar and closer experiences- they will have a different perception. Therefore these two have to be accepted as a given and different from each other. This author adds that these are not meant to be studied as fixed because their identity, interests, and culture -individually or collectively- can (and will) change. (Ruggie, 1998).

Ruggie (1998) also states that in our current system, the collective group identity -in this specific case, the states- has been given a generic identity and interest for purposes of *status quo* by the international community to be easier to identify a particular country. Still, one has to make a difference while analyzing a state as part of it and its true identity given by its history and people at that particular time. To illustrate this, he mentions how, with different people or attitudes or even at a different time, the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany could have ended as the hegemon in our era. He joins this idea under the concept of "radical recalibration of interests" for individuals and groups.

Wendt (1992) mentions that while analyzing an age, we do not have to take their identity and interests as a given and add the factor of change of behavior. For the latter, he studies how one does not always change the former, but one can also change one behavior

depending on which context one is in at that time. In other words, actors do not have a sole identity; they have multiple that will kick in depending on the institution they are acting upon. He exemplifies this with a daily example: Educators. When they are in their roles as professors, they set these roles and understanding under this specific agency: their only interest and behavior will be regarding education for their students. However, they are not educators all the time. Once that is over, they will change their roles into coworkers, parents, friends, among others (Wendt, 1992).

For Wendt (1992), identity must be seen as an interchangeable trait that works under a specific psychological reality in this socially constructed world. Taking the previous example, an educator will act like one in the appropriate settings. Still, they will stop being an educator once they turn their identity into one of a parent or a friend, to mention some. Even leaders are not leaders all the time; they will act as such when it is due, and then they will change their role into the one that the context demands.

According to Wendt (1992), the same thing that happens with identities happens with interest. The former is the latter's foundation, and the interests will be set within a situation because each situation calls for a different action. The same author mentions that we tend to construe the meaning on the spot when dealing with an unprecedented condition, hence our interests in it (Wendt, 1992).

As for the former -identity and interests- they are in the process of continuous development with each other. That is why they have to be taken as part of an endogenous progression instead of an exogenous one because it is a fact that one will shape each other in an uninterrupted cycle.

Wendt (1992), for a better study, decided to divide identities into three distinctive groups: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. The first one, named after Thomas Hobbes, is

when the human drive is egoism and power, one has to be with their guards up as we are in a constant state of war, and X has to be defending itself from Y. Under this setting, different identity and interest structures will be created as the other parts involved -X, Y- compete for power over and over. Nonetheless, Wendt (1992) states that these threats are socially constructed. Following this perspective, collective action is impossible for this group because the fear of being attacked is always there.

Taking its name because of John Locke, the second one believes that others can be enemies, but they do not seek to eliminate them like the first group and see they can coexist but not have a relationship with them. That was the primary focus after the Peace of Westphalia. (Wendt, 1992).

In the third group, which is the Kantian identity, where they positively identify the others, it is easier to build a notion of a community whose interests will be either altruistic or prosocial. The parties can regard themselves as friends and will try to settle their issues peacefully, as part of a community. (Wendt, 1992).

1.1.2 Structures-Environment

Reus-Smit (1999) states that structures -or agencies- can also be called institutions as they are the ones that set the norms, rules that drive society. However, agents previously discussed these institutions are also formed, who will control which behaviors will be acceptable within their leading agency. Therefore, Reus-Smit (1999) sees institutions as the ones that will shape the identity of the individuals. Still, it is not only the identity *per se* that these will shape but also other aspects of these individuals' lives, such as economy, culture, and political activities, regarded as appropriate within that institution. To exemplify this, we can use an example in the microenvironment of the parents of a child. As an agency -which these particular agents subsequently form -, they will teach the kid as they think best and

normalize what religion the individual will practice, see the political spectrum, or what economic model they are appealed to the most. A bigger perspective is what a community or a government does to their *governées.*

At this point, Reus-Smit (1999) also stresses the importance of the historical and cultural in each setting -whether in a micro or macro view- as they will construe different structures based on different fundamentals, nonetheless in the macro perspective, he also adds the geopolitical and economic system. By mentioning this, we can see the actual base of Constructivism because if we were to compare two small communities whose locations were not far from each other and their starting points in time were relatively close, taking that to the future, we may see that these two are indeed different because of what has happened in their own communities and the people that were in front of them had other ideas and values. That will mark the importance of the structures and the environment in the people's identity and relationships. Suppose we could embody this example with countries. In that case, we can study how the current territories of Ecuador and Argentina, both "founded" at the same relative time and by the same colonizers, are most definitely different because of their backgrounds before this fact but also because of the culture that was created within the territories and the decisions taken by their own people.

Ruggie (1998) explains that the structures and the environment where they act are as crucial to the identity construction as it is to the development of their structures. He mentions the fact that the United States was seen as the hegemon after World War II, not only help to build their internal and external concept as the world leader, but also how the structures that were created helped that concept building. In simpler words, it is not what the structure X gives but also how this shapes the other structures -Y. Z- that will, once again, transform that

first structure -X- in an endless cycle until one stops its influence on the other, or ultimate, its existence.

Ruggie (1998) explains that the importance of the example beforehand mentioned is because, in a different reality, how would the world be if the Allies did not win the war or another winner of WWII took the leadership role and shaped our history differently? That would have had a domino effect and would have changed almost everyone's identity and interest. Hence, our identities and structures should not be considered "when" but as "if." Obviously, one cannot change the past, but the present and the future **can** be changed depending on our decisions. This concept is applied when comparing Germany and Japan from before the war, and after it, they are different; we cannot say if better or worse, but different (Ruggie, 1998).

Ruggie (1998) also states that we cannot see a structure as fixed because it is bounded and interconnected through context with different actors, objectives, resources. Precisely as it happens with individuals, the structures are meant to develop towards what the agents think of it -at that time- and the decisions made (Ruggie, 1998).

Wendt (1992) studies under this concept of institutions the so-called "self-help" system as inaccurate because, with it, nothing is seen as part of a structure or institution, but rather as a process with no interaction with others, which according to Wendt (1992) would be part of anarchy. Under this anarchy, the agent does not redevelop or change their core -identity or interests- but only has a behavioral adaptation; in other words, according to this logic, people do not change, only a limited shift on their behaviors in different situations.

However, Wendt explains, we cannot avoid the idea of an institution as they are bounded with practices learned through knowledge, and whichever institution we are dealing with at the moment will alter our interests. These will grow into social expectations and

behaviors that will evolve as norms. Hence, our identities and interests must be studied as a dependent variable within that particular context (Wendt, 1992).

There is even a structure because people are social beings; the fundamental principle of this theory is that people are subsequently drawn to other actors and try to get away from others. Thus, we act differently with our friends than with our so-called enemies. That is why if, taking once again the example of the United States and the Soviet Union, if they one day decided they are no longer enemies, the war is over because it is a decision on their behavior to act as enemies. (Wendt, 1992).

Nevertheless, we can apply Onuf's concept of social facts; as Wendt (1992) states institutions are subjective as they are constituted by nothing but the people's beliefs acting upon them. It is an embodiment of this collective knowledge of these agents; if they were to change their beliefs, this institution would change with it. Thus, these -identities, interests, structures- are mutually constructed; if one changes, the others will as well.

1.1.3 Positions, rules, and relationships

Onuf establishes that "solid facts" when studying social theory are not even partially actual and should not be taken for granted because the tendency in this field is to analyze society as a firm ground when in reality, it is anything but solid. This author believes in deeds. People (viewed as individuals) and a community constitute and construe one to the other in a semi endless cycle. One should make a slight difference between the material and social reality with a historical perspective. (Onuf, 1989). To exemplify the latter, Onuf (1989) uses language as a tool, as it transforms how we think and our culture itself and, in that process, determining how we view the world as we are socially developed by it. A child in Japan will have a completely different perspective of an Ecuadorian child just for the mere fact of the language and its history.

Setting this principle that everything within a society is socially constructed, not natural but somewhat normalized, one can study that we are the result of our constructions. Because of that, we stand by them or deconstruct *and* reconstruct ourselves as individuals and part of a group. (Onuf, 1989).

Reus-Smit (1999) follows that train of thought, and that is the reason behind his concept of "regime," as it can be seen as a cluster of principles, norms, decision-making, and explicit and implicit rules within specific areas. That is why it is easier under this perspective for a group of communities, societies, and countries to identify with because it is easier to relate to them. I.e., in the Americas, one can see some divisions with the Anglophones, the South American region, and the Caribbean because it is easier to be related to them.

The same author (1999) relates to a concept called "*social communication,*" where it states how social relations are based on common pre-existing values, norms, beliefs, and even similar identities that will define legitimacy. That means that if one of the two parties does not regard the other as valid and does not share what they praise as their principles, they will not follow what the other person is preaching or their actions, to the point where they will argue to show that the only valid thoughts are theirs. Though, if they **agree on these social communications, they will construe legitimate social agents who will** create an agency to influence others. He also defends how, even though we may not share the same perspective as our counterpart, we must explain why we are behaving or thinking in some way as part of our social communication role. We cannot only say: "Because I say/think so," that statement does not allow an opportunity to understand the other. Reus-Smit (1999) further mentions that this applies to individuals and nations when questioned about taking specific actions.

John Ruggie (1998) follows the concept of "social facts"; however, he divides two types of social facts. One being "brute facts," which can be interpreted as factual data or

probable data, that no matter what people things, these are going to continue being faithful. The other type of social facts being the kind discussed before, a subjective fact that is true depending on the person and their individual experience, including the perception **and** misperception of others. (Ruggie, 1998).

Alexander Wendt (1992) states that everything -position, rules, and interests- results from an ongoing process; almost nothing comes randomly. Even if we were to be in a self-help world, it is because of a social process. That is the reason why Wendt considers self-help and power politics as institutions, not as processes. This process resulted from an evolution that transformed our personal identities and changed egoistic idealism into a collective identity. For this, Wendt, once again, enhances that social threats are constructed, not natural. He also adds that in a social setting, as part of this collective process, we cannot just assume a worst-case scenario because this will hold our interests and actions back, limiting our willingness to interact with other agents. (Wendt, 1992).


Wendt (1992) sets that in a collective situation, the identity and interest tend to mirror one of the others over time. To illustrate this from a micro-perspective, we can put the example of a family. At one point, the parent's self will mirror the other, and it will be diffusive whose interest or rule originally it was. That is the reason behind why in society, as part of our relationships, we interpret, respond and sign or gesture what we mean to others, hoping they get the message we are trying to send as a social act. However, these are also bounded to the collective group we are part of, which can mean totally different things with other groups, which is why Wendt describes social configurations more as subjective than objective, as well as these identities and interests beforementioned are specific to a relationship, these change from some to others. (Wendt, 1992).

Because these are established as subjective, this social process is always under construction and reconstruction, not only within us -identity and interests- but with its social relationships and practices (Wendt, 1992). Henceforth, it is a social construe of what behaviors or acts are accepted and which are the ones rejected. These behaviors help us fit better as individuals and support us in maintaining role identities within a group. It cannot be said this practice is good or bad, but it is how a group is usually driven.

To set an illustration, we can make a social comparison between former centuries and the current 21st century, before it could be seen as scandalous when a woman tried to break the mold by studying or working; but today that is -in almost all cultures- normalized and encouraged, because our social rules have changed. The same could be said about the LGBTQI+ community, as it was seen as "a sin" centuries ago, but now this community is accepted more into society. Moreover, what we have currently normalized cannot be said to be the norm in a couple of decades because our relationships are meant to develop and improve.

Figure #1

The cycle of influences under Constructivism



Source: Onuf, 1989; Reus-Smit, 1999; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 1992

Elaborated by Maria Jose Santamaria

1.2 Terrorism

In this subchapter, we will briefly but deeply explain what terrorism for the academia consensus is, with the words of Alex Schmid, who has been a leader in Terrorism studies for several decades. Here we will study the main concepts, perspectives, and tactics to see if a group is a terrorist or not. Henceforth, with this, we can apply it to the proposed case study in the following chapters.

1.2.1 Terrorism, according to Alex Schmid

To begin with, Alex Schmid states that terrorism has to be seen through different perspectives; it is not only an act of terrorism, but its goal can also be criminal, political, warfare, communication, or a religious purpose or sacrifice (Schmid, 2011).

Schmid further explains that the main objective of an act of terrorism is terror; that is how the word terrorism comes to life. Terror, per Schmid's words, is a constant intense state of fear because of a threatening situation that includes violence; this can be lived on a personal level or a collective one. Terrorism looks for activities or methods that will consciously trigger that psychological level of terror in order to manipulate its victims (Schmid, 2011).

Therefore, the acts of terrorism are set to trigger and terrorize the state of mind of its victims and their surroundings -whether that is in the proximity of their community, governments, or even to the people watching it from a TV-. Nevertheless, it works on the act itself and the fear of uncertainty that people deal with, knowing that one can suddenly die or be part of these acts as collateral victims. Furthermore, people that have survived these acts will always carry psychological damage -Post Traumatic Stress Disease -PTSD- in most cases- where they are always in the panic that could happen again (Schmid, 2011).

However, it is essential to point out that not all acts of violence are considered terrorism. This term is usually wrongfully used to describe almost all times of violence, including political violence, hate crimes, repression, among others. Thus, that is why the United Nations has not given a consensus of what terrorism is and what is not. (Schmid, 2011).

Nonetheless, Schmid states that the motives behind terrorism can be "revenge, intimidation, political blackmail, attention or recognition, disruption, martyrdom, morale building, abolition of opposition forces and extortion" (Schmid, 2011). The author highlights that even though the reason for the existence of some of these groups may be legitimate, the activities that they engage with makes them unlawful under the scoop of war and actors of crimes against humanity. The activities and techniques that are mainly used for acts of

terrorism are mutilations -legs, hands-, kidnapping, assassination, arson, mass-murdering, poisonings, bombings, torture, massacres, use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN), or disappearances -a combination of kidnapping, torturing, and murdering an individual- (Schmid, 2011).

The continuous action of a terrorist organization may be because of revenge of historical or ideological root causes, because of an expected political gain, to polarize the other party -especially when the counterparty is a government- or because their actions may accelerate or decrease the rate of other conflicts where they have interests. (Schmid, 2011). A terrorist group may also continue with its activities as part of a cycle of revenge. It became its means of survival for the members, or the group itself, or these activities became too profitable for the group to stop them. Schmid calls this a cycle with no exit strategy. (Schmid, 2011).

Between the characteristics that Schmid mentions for a group to qualify as a terrorist, there must be premeditation of the crimes, and there must be a political, ideological, or religious motive behind it, non-combatant people must do it to civilians but sometimes to combatant people -whether on duty or not-. Its message must be trying to influence the party or group -*the target of demand or target of attention*- they are trying to reach (the message being that one of terror and the possibility of action). The act of terrorism is not about the result of the activity. However, the message it sends by using random instrumental victims or symbolic things as the *target of violence/ opportunity*. The expectation for this message is to influence in the long or short term the target of demand. (Schmid, 2011).

Nevertheless, still, Schmid explains that there are **some cases** where these victims are specifically chosen, such as leaders or a particular person, where this act of murder itself is not classified as pure violence or just an assassination, but as part of a symbol of the act of

terrorism because it will be giving the same message of terror and action as it was mentioned before. The author states that John F. Kennedy's assassination was just that, whereas if it is perpetrated by a guerrilla or a terrorist organization in the middle of a dispute or a war, the killing of a leader will undoubtedly have repercussions in that conflict, that is when it is counted as an act of terrorism (Schmid, 2011).

Alex Schmid (2011) mentions, however, that not only sub-state actors can be terrorist but states as well, if its target is repression against their opposition and take part of actions such as massive killings and disappearances with the objective of terrorizing that part of the population, it would also qualify as a terrorist act because even if they have the monopoly of legitimate force, they do not use it accordingly and abide by the rule of law (Schmid, 2011). In a historical context, the author mentions the Nazi Brownshirt in the 1920s, killing socialists in the streets to discourage their opponents. More recently and in our region, the dictatorships in Argentina with the *Junta Militar* -Military Junta-led by Videla or Chile with Pinochet could also qualify as terrorist because of their continuous actions to terrorize the ones against them. Furthermore, nowadays, and quite notoriously in Mexico, the Cartels can be qualified as terrorists because of their efforts to quiet down and terrorize the general population and the government.

As part of an academic consensus of the definition of terrorism, conceptualized by Schmid (2011), there must be specific characteristics for a group to be considered as terrorist:

-The group that carries these criminal activities do them as a tactic of fear generation; these are calculated, premeditated, and do not abide by legal or moral restrictions. These are targeted mainly to civilians/innocent people as part of a propaganda cycle to affect psychologically those around the actions and who do not have a say in the conflict.

-When the group of activities involves physical violence such as the before mentioned -bombings, mass assassination, disappearances, tortures, among others-.

-The victims of such attacks are not the target but act as part of the message to be delivered to the media -for an effect of fear-causing- and the ultimate targets.

It can be considered when it is under one of the following scenarios: (a) Illegal state repression. (b) Done by a group to disturb the context outside of a conflict or when in peace. (c) As illegal activities supported by third-party actors to influence a situation.

They use this thread of activities as part of a threat-based communication to demand certain things or conditions to the counterparty -government, community, whomever they aim to get- and seek support from those who may agree with the group's ideology.

-The size of the terrorist organization may vary; it can be small (less than ten people) to transnational groups supported by third-party states or non-state actors.

-Terrorist violence is primarily political, social, and ideological. That is the reason why there is no single action but rather a campaign of violence.

1.3 Human Rights

This subchapter will briefly explain what human rights are and the most relevant to the study case to analyze in the following chapters if the Lord Resistance Army has violated them grossly and committed crimes against humanity and war crimes.

1.3.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

The utter importance of this international document signed and adopted in 1948 is because, for the first time in history, we had a baseline of what human rights are, hence, its

violations to them (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d). It is imperative to briefly revise them to see how the state and the Lord's Resistance Army have violated these throughout history.

As its name mentions, this document is universal, so it applies to every single individual. These rights cannot be violated, transferred, divided, or taken away from us for no reason, no matter our background -gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion, just to mention some- (Art. 2) (United Nations, 1948). Henceforth, the States should observe that people have them and actively protect their people against groups or people taking away these rights (OHCHR, n.d).

Another inalienable right is being able to live with freedom and security (Art. 3). These rights mean that there can be no slaves or subjects of slavery (Art. 4). A person should also not suffer torture or cruel punishment. (Art. 5). All people are free to think or affiliate themselves with whomever they see best, including religion, beliefs, or worship. (Art. 18). In Art 25, it is stated that every single individual must have a satisfactory lifestyle, including but not limited to: food, housing, health, clothing. Moreover, no person or group can commit any actions that may affect these rights (Art 30). (United Nations, 1948).

For this chapter, we must remember that this chapter's objective was to theorize Constructivism and terrorism for them to be applied later on to Ugandan history and the Lord's Resistance Army in the following chapters. The critical points for this chapter have been the circular influence for Constructivism, making us realize that we are who we are because of our enormous historical background and the people surrounding us. Still, then, a person will go and influence the structure that will influence us. This never-ending cycle makes it possible for us to construct, deconstruct or reconstruct who we are. As the authors stated before, we are not meant to be fixed; just as matter, we can transform, shape, or

remove everything socially constructed. In the second subchapter, one could deeply explain what terrorism is, what is not, and when an organization can be considered. Schmid (2011) showed us how there is no one-size-fits-all for terrorism; that is why we studied how it can come from different perspectives, criminal, political, warfare, religion, and others. We could also see how this term -terrorism- has been wrongly used for all types of violence when it is not, more than the act itself. It is the tactic of psychologically affecting people through constant states of terror and fear to send a message to both counterparts and those who are appealed to their ideologies. We were also explained how its motives are primarily political, whether trying to get to power or destabilizing the current one for another party. Still, we can also observe that there are ideological and religious groups trying to express their views. Terrorism is entirely illegal, not because of its roots but because of its methods to transmit such messages. Finally, in the third subchapter, we briefly reviewed what human rights are, and we listed the ones that one can consider as the most important ones for this case study.

CHAPTER TWO

UGANDA AND HOW IT SHAPED HISTORY

Introduction

This chapter aims to study the history of Uganda and its development throughout the years that may or may not cause the armed organization Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The first subchapter focuses on the arrival of the British to the Ugandan territory and the Ugandan Independence with Dr. Milton Obote. The second subchapter comprises the regimes of General Idi Amin, the rise and fall of Milton Obote, and the Ugandan Bush War, which brought Yoweri Museveni to power. In the final subchapter, one will study the formation of the Lord's Resistance Army as an ethnic defense group, its creator, and the first years of the LRA. For this chapter, one will use the Constructivism of Onuf, Wendt, Reus-Smit, and Ruggie.

2 Uganda

Uganda is an eastern nation in the African Continent, with a population of over 45 million people. It is a landlocked territory, independent since 1962. As a nation, Uganda was created with the arrival of the British Empire to this land in the late 1800s. Its neighboring countries are South Sudan, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its economy is one of the lowest in the world, the 199th economy of the world. Yoweri Museveni has been the head of state of the nation since 1986. The nation has had health, illiteracy, and development problems, being an average age of 15.6 years, and the fertility rate is that of 5 children per woman, an unemployment rate of 83 percent, and a poverty level of circa 65%. Nowadays, its economy is based mainly on international donations; even if they have natural resources, they do not have the machinery to exploit them. (Kisekka-Ntale & Doro, 2014)

(Oxford Martin School; Our World in Data, n.d) (Statista, 2021) (Focus Economics, 2020) (Moody's Analytics, 2021) (Matti, 2012) (Al Jazeera, 2021)

Figure 2

Ethnic map of Uganda



Source: Gordon, 2005

Elaborated by Gordon (2005)

2.1 British protectorate and Ugandan independence: roots of the division (1962)

2.1.1 British protectorate in the territory

Before the arrival of the Asian British people to the territory known as Uganda, this land was formed by several tribes, enemies between one and other, but trying to limit themselves to their places and activities. The tribes throughout centuries had a model of family-led clans, with a limited number of members of each. Since the late 1800's/early 1900's the southern tribes of the

"nation" were mainly dedicated to agriculture and the land. The ones in the north were more mobile than the southern, so they developed their skills for arms and the defense of their livestock. In this land, they coexisted four significant types of ethnic groups: The Bantu, the Nilotic, The NiloHamitics/Sudanics, and the Hamites (Byrnes, R. M., Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division & Thomas Leiper Kane Collection, 1992) (The World Factbook, 2014).

Table #1

Ethnic Groups and Tribes in Uganda

Ethnic Group	**Tribes**
Bantu	Buganda, Bakiga, Banyoro, Banyarwanda, Banyankole, Basoga, Batoro, Bagisu, Bagwere, Bakonjo.
Nilotic	Acholi, Alur, Jonam, Lango, Lulya, Padhola.
NiloHamitics and Sudanics	Karamojong, Kumam, Kakwa, Labwor, Lendu, Lugbara, Madi, Pokot, Sebei, Tepeth, Teso.
Hamites	Bahima.

Source: The World Factbook (2014)

Elaborated by Maria Jose Santamaria (2021)

Before the arrival of the British to this land, there were 28 tribes -mentioned in the table above- around this territory. The colonizers arrived in this land in the late 1800s because of economic and military reasons -transferring the British-Indian military units to this part of the world-. They offered "colonial administration" to the chiefs of Buganda in exchange for the former mentioned. The two systems coexisted, the chiefs/kings were in the leading roles, but the

British commissioners were in charge of the administration. Then, they started treaties with hefty taxation on the other kingdoms/tribes because of their services, less generous than those with Buganda. When the British and Buganda kingdom united forces, the latter started to "conquer" the other clans as part of what they called "Lost Land." (Byrnes, R. M., Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division & Thomas Leiper Kane Collection, 1992).

Then, the British government declared the land of Uganda as a British protectorate in 1894, becoming the "administrative, consultation, guidance and protective" part of this land. Under this protectorate, the British were to execute the judicial, administrative, and executive power; thus, they started by setting the territory's borders, and therefore, Uganda was born. The reason why the British were so interested in this land was because of the convenience as a route towards India. Its name was set after the Kingdom of Buganda, its main ally in the ground. (Kanyeihamba, 2010).

This "newly founded" country expanded to the tribes/kingdoms with or without them agreeing to be part of it. The British also decided the political division within the country without considering what the tribes/kingdoms were to say about it. They just split up the country for their own interests -military positions, trades, raw materials- by following the geographical position of mountains and rivers, even though they separated parts of ethnic tribes without care. They also made the chiefs or kings sign the rights over their lands without knowing what they were signing for or conceding, losing their rights as leaders to the British government. (Kanyeihamba, 2010) (Fiber, 2017).

Here we could consider what Reus-Smit (1999) explains about cultural context and how our interests and identities are linked. In this straightforward example, one could see why the

tribes/clans were interested in not being part of this country because they would lose their autonomy under what they considered their lands and their families. This fact is essential as in Uganda, families formed most clans, and it was these vast families that created the legacy and the tribes). In the second place, the people who divided the country did not care about separating the clans and their members, putting a gap between them. They acted as emotional and support within their own families. However, these administration lines were imaginary; the political division is just that, a social fact, so they were not actually divided. Nevertheless, once again, from the native people's perspective, the British were trying to tie them to some regions because of their interests. They did not care if they were uniting tribes that were enemies with another or how this could affect the ethnic groups in the future. (Kanyeihamba, 2010) (Amone & Muura, 2013) (Reus-Smit, 1999) (Fiber, 2017). Adyanga (2011) states that the British took all their decisions based on their interests alone, never watching those of the Ugandans. That would have concordance with what Wendt (1992) mentions about the three identities; this could be classified as a Lockean one, guarding their interests but not trying to kill the other, mainly because "the other" was their source of interest (Wendt, 1992) (Adyanga, 2011).

When the status of Uganda as a protectorate was signed, it stated that the primary goal of this alliance in the long term would be for Uganda to become an independent country -stated in the Ugandan Agreement of 1900-, and the people that would rule it would be the people of the Kingdom of Buganda (Kanyeihamba, 2010) (Summers & Sikainga, 2015).

Another important fact to mention is that the British had a mission to spread Christianity as the tribes had their native religions or Muslims. At the same time, there were missions from elsewhere, trying to convert the natives into Jewism, Roman Catholicism. (Kanyeihamba, 2010). The importance of this division of religions or faith will start at that moment, and it will become

a huge problem, which we will talk about later in the chapter. Adyanga (2011) asserts that the introduction of Christianity (ideological indoctrination in the author's words) to this land was one of the methods of British control to the Africans because these missions took the lead in schooling, totally disregarding the native's knowledge or perspectives. Besides this control method, Adyanga also mentions the display of military power, the control of their economy, and their policies. (Adyanga, 2011).

Returning to the topic of religion, some kings/chiefs were explicitly against it, like *Kabaka* - King- Mutesa of Buganda, their main ally, because they saw the harm, it might cause to their communities. Because of a former try of converting some of their people to Islamism, furthering them from their own beliefs. Furthermore, they only shared their Eurocentric misperceptions of the African people calling them: degraded, pagans, and depraved creatures who were missing God. Therefore, according to them, the only "fix" for them as people and their issues was Christianity (Adyanga, 2011).

As Gartrell (1983) analyses, the British obviously did not realize the historical context that they were taught as Africans as *quasi* sub-humans under their perspective. While they were in this land, they used to treat them as second-class citizens who only were worth hearing when they forcefully adapted themselves to their views. Another critical fact that Gartrell studies are that even though there were many different tribes, they just put them in the same bag without respecting their differences. (Gartrell, 1983). Therefore this shows us how history and what we are taught do shape our interests and identities, as Reus-Smit has studied (Reus-Smit, 1999).

This type of relationship between the British and the Ugandans made the latter create a Big Man pattern after some years, whereas what the former said/taught was the correct thing, and

they just followed it (Gartrell, 1983). As Wendt (1992) mentions, after some time, our identities start to mirror those of the others, and it begins to act as a mixture of those traits, different from what it has initially been constructed (Wendt, 1992). That is a textbook example of what happened in this land at that time.

The colonizers used this pattern as an advantage to establish some modern institutions with the assistance of the chiefs/kings by putting them in administrative roles as well. Hence, it was more convincing for their people. They also used this as a method for disassociation between the chiefs' functions and the adaptation to this new regime of detribalization (Gartrell, 1983).

As we could see, the foundations of this country had a lack of cohesiveness for its people as they did not see themselves as Ugandans but rather as part of their tribes, only having as common ground their high regard towards the British their teachings. The breach between the people of this country got bigger and bigger at the beginning of the Second World War.

As one of the colonies/protectorates of the British Empire, Uganda tried to show its loyalty and competence to its colonizers during this war. Approximately 77,000 Ugandan people fought as British soldiers; they accepted high taxes, increased the amount of cotton and coffee produced enough for them, and even donated their money (1 million pounds directly from Uganda) to the British cause. They did all this to demonstrate that they accepted British superiority, and they were hoping in return for them to give them more opportunities for growth (Summers & Sikainga, 2015). However, we must point out that these men were mainly from the north of the country. Since centuries ago, we must remember that the country's southern parts were agriculturalists and worked their land. At the same time, the northern tribes were mainly

nomads or had other activities such as trading ivory or goods in general. Hence, they did not have the capital or skilled/quality work; however, they have trained as fighter men (Amone & Muura, 2013) (Fiber, 2017).

Because of the mentioned above, the British Empire divided Uganda in two, labor zone -the North- and production zone -the south- where the latter had to provide for the former in forms of food by the former had to work in the fields for the southern. This formal division came as the colonizers saw the southern people as hardworking people; meanwhile, the northern were seen as people with superior physique for soldiers and intellectually superior to the point where northern people formed the Ugandan military from the ethnic group Acholi. Nevertheless, the British emphasized the development of the south with roads, schools, and health centers, among others, because of the productivity -coffee, tea among others- that they provided for the colonizers, especially in their ally's territory, the Buganda Kingdom. They purposely divided the nation to delay the independence process as much as possible. (Amone & Muura, 2013) (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2010).

As it was priorly discussed, the Ugandans developed a pattern of utter admiration towards the British, so their actions of preferring Buganda over everyone but also emphasizing the intelligence, leadership, and the military skills of the northerners -even when they put no effort in building infrastructures such as schools or roads or health centers in the north -. The British feared that if they trained the south in military activities, they would try to overcome the British status and seek their independence without the terms proposed by them. Thus, the British kingdom decided to train the north in military and administrative duties. That started some ethnic conflicts and inner nationalism within the tribes that would escalate into conflict after the country's independence. (Amone & Muura, 2013).

2.1.2 Process of Independence: Obote and the role of the north

This process started back in 1961 with a reunion called the "London Conference" where all colonies/protectorates of the British Empire had to attend if they were to decide their self-determination -whether they would continue being part of the empire or they were to be declared as independent-. This conference was set in London where the groups of delegates trying to "earn" their independence had to go with their advisors -who could not be British-. That was a way of stopping them from going to the United Kingdom because of the economic difficulties that would represent (to fly at least 200 people from their origin countries to London was very expensive and impossible for many colonies) (Kanyeihamba, 2010).

However, the Ugandans achieved their independence, overcoming all the obstacles put by the British in what would be called the London Agreement of 1962, where both parties created the Ugandan Constitution that would be effective the next day. The first democratic election in this country was held in the same month of the Agreement to elect a Prime Minister to carry all governmental duties. The electors decided for Milton Obote, a Langi descendant from the northern tribes, who should work under President Mutesa. The Britons passed the Ugandan Independence Act in August, mentioning they would have no ties with the country since October 9th (Kanyeihamba, 2010).

Milton Obote worked with Mutesa for the first two years since the independence but quickly put the army on his side to overthrow the President, thus becoming the President of Uganda. Since the beginning of Obote's regime, he made clear he was on the military side, meeting their higher salaries and promotion requirements, making them a prominent part of society. One of the young recruits would be Idi Amin, who would become one of his protégés.

Milton Obote mentioned that his ultimate goal with his regime was to unify the country and stop the nationalism of each tribe from having one prominent identity as a nation. However, during his governmental ruling, he demonstrated bias pro north. Obote started to neglect the south, especially the Buganda region, formally the most developed tribe because of the British. Then he had an administration with almost exclusively northern people; Obote started a strategic military alliance with the Acholi, who had a culture similar to his tribe, the Langi. Obote abused his power and gave a loose hand to the military. They started to use violence and oppression against the civilians in Buganda and the southern regions in general. This abuse escalated to the point where the soldiers were drunk with their rifles threatening people, or even shooting and killing them without reason or respecting the rule of law, so they started to hide. Dinwiddy (1983) expresses that the army's weapons were not used to protect the people but rather to terrorize them. (Dinwiddy, 1983).

One could analyze that the specific targeting against the southerners might be because of two reasons. The first being that they were led to believe by the British that they were superior to their southern counterparts because of their physique and intelligence -even though there was no factual data to prove that-. That was only what the British needed them to believe to better work for their interests. The second cause may be because how the British neglected the rest of the country and only helping the infrastructural improvement of Buganda, letting the rest as if they did not matter. As Onuf (1989) stated, nothing in our identities or interests is fixed; they are bounded to our history, events, and choices that happened internally or externally. In this case, we could see the direct influence of the British sayings on the Ugandans, leading them to act superior to others. While the British were in this territory, the people of Buganda felt entitled to it, and the anger or negligence that came from the other parts of the country because they did not

have the opportunities presented to the others. As Reus-Smit (1999) studied, we are going to act according to the cultural context. If we consider that there were already issues between the tribes, these problems exponentially increased with the Britons' arrivals. Hence, when the northerners led by Dr. Milton Obote had the power, they started to abuse it against the rest, creating a bigger gap between the tribes of the north and the south. Because that is what the people were taught under this system, no union but to use their power in any way they wanted. Even if Obote mentioned that he wanted a unified Uganda and had a leftist speech ("Move to the Left") with the wish for one country-one people and not for the privileged; his actions were nowhere near that as he tried to hold all powers, making sure their National Assembly, the whole executive was only following his orders. The army only listened to him, and he was their leader to follow. Moreover, instead of stopping the army, Obote increased it and even created Special Police Forces and secret agents carrying the same negative actions as the army and publicly congratulating the soldiers for "their skills and their art of political manipulation." These military members started to occupy governmental posts, making the Obote regime a divisionary command of abuse. However, as it has been stated, the Obote regime could have changed the course of action by actually trying to change their historical structure and rebuild it for a better Uganda for all, which was not the case; furthering the ethnic problems with the *coup* performed by his former protégé, Idi Amin. (Onuf, 1989) (Reus-Smit, 1999) (Dinwiddy, 1983) (Saul, 1976) (Glentworth & Hancock, 1973).

2.2 The end of the relative peace in Uganda

This subchapter seeks to evaluate how the actions of the governments after Obote's first regime influenced the creation of the armed group Lord's Resistance Army. In subchapter one will be studying the horrifying regime of Idi Amin, who bloodshed almost all tribes in the

country, especially the Langi and the Acholi. Then, how Amin's dictatorship factored in for the return of another period of vengeance from Milton Obote with the help of the Tanzania People's Defense Force (TPDF) and other internal guerrillas. The final part of this subchapter explores the Ugandan Bush War putting Museveni in power, and this being the final nail for the creation of the LRA organization.

2.2.1 Idi Amin, dictator, and general bloodshed

General Idi Amin, a Kakwa descendent, overthrew Dr. Milton Obote's regime by a military coup from the inside of it in 1971 and declared himself President of Uganda. Most of Amin's upbringing was in the military, where he has been since his early teens, even becoming Obote's protégé. This structure where he grew at could factor in seeing violence as the only means for control. Amin was obsessed with race and ethnic cleansing. At the beginning of his regime, he started to expel people from Asia or their descendants -especially Indians that arrive at the same time as the British-, because Amin had a goal of an all-black Uganda. At the same time, Amin Dada ruthlessly started to kill off his opponents, inside and outside the military. Since the Amin era, he was convinced that secret plans were to take him out of power. His armed forces would enter houses to question people about it. When religious and former cabinet members -from Obote's era- publicly mentioned how he was violating Human Rights, General Amin took them to be judged -by his own staff- and forced them to "confess" things, after this trial, as these people were being taken to detention, they mysteriously had a deadly accident on the car that was taking them. This event, in 1971, marked the beginning of a terrible period for Uganda. (Decker, 2010) (Glentworth & Hancock, 1973).

As Amin was at the core of the military, they became the country's central government, giving them all the means of power and control. Glentworth & Hancock (1973) mention that Amin just raised what he inherited from Obote's regime; there was no drastic change in how the military was working, but the tribes within that power. As the military forces were full of Acholi and Langi people (because it was Obote's tribe and their allies), he drastically took power from them and gave it to the Northwestern tribes, the Kakwa -his tribe-, the Lugbara, and the Madi. Among the first actions of the Amin regime, there was the total dismissal of the former cabinet parties of Obote, detentions without trials, and the three tribes of the coalition could do absolutely anything to get rid of the Langi and Acholi people in the military. It has been described that if the Acholi/Langi men did not go away voluntarily, Amin and his men would put them in a single line and kill every one of them. (Glentworth & Hancock, 1973) (Kreimer, A.; World Bank, 2000).

As Wendt (1992) states, the people build the agencies that will shape people's identities. Here, there was no firm foundation for what the people wanted Uganda to be; they just molded the institution of government for their interests because that is what they have been taught in their history, Obote continued this role, and Amin perpetuated further. There were no interests or motivation to build an Uganda that would benefit all, but rather only the tribes that had the power at that time. That can be seen as a consequence of British colonialism, as the northerners saw how many privileges the Buganda people had because they were next to the British power. They developed the idea that the only way to govern was to control all power and diminish the rest of the tribes. It already happened with the Obote regime where even though the Langi and the Acholi were not the best of allies, the hunger for power and wealth drove their differences away to be united against the rest, the history was repeating itself with the Kakwa, the Lugbara, and

the Madi, whatever it took them to improve their inside communities, a winner-takes-all mentality. (Glentworth & Hancock, 1973).

If the army already had plenty of freedom in their actions with Obote, they extremized their actions by a free hand given by General Amin, who stated at that time that these actions were part of the pacification of Buganda. Like it was previously mentioned, Amin wanted vengeance against the people that had the power before him, first being the "White Man" and second the tribes that controlled Uganda - Buganda, the Langi, and the Acholi-. Amin started a campaign called "Keep Uganda Clean" both literally -Uganda was suffering from a garbage problem. It was accumulating in urban and rural areas-and metaphorically, and the outsiders were dirt and undesirable. This campaign expelled more than 50,000 Asians or their offspring, and the repression with the three tribes formerly mentioned. Ironically, because of these evictions, the garbage problem started, as the Asian Ugandas had as part of their many industries, the garbage recollection. The garbage problem also brought sanitary, civil, and migration problems -people trying to leave the areas where the garbage was being accumulated. That got to the point where people had feared dust, and if a building/house were not cleaned, it would get destroyed; cars had to be cleaned in specific areas; if a person were to clean it outside of those areas, they would get beaten. Amin and his men were so into the national cleansing that slippers were banned as they saw them as shoes that would litter the city; if one of the armed people saw people wearing them, they would force them to eat the slippers (Nayenga, 1979) (Decker, 2010).

As stated in the first subchapter, with the arrival of the British, many religious missions arrived with them, among them the Catholics, Christians, Jews, and Muslims. The Muslims significantly influenced the Kawka tribe, and Idi Amin became a devoted Muslim. While he publicly announced that he would tolerate all religions, there were several suspicious

disappearances of Catholic groupings. One should also add that any opposition was also vanished, killed, or cruelly tortured. Amin took what he had already inherited from the past administrations -both the British and Obote- and took it to the next level. (Nayenga, 1979) (Glentworth & Hancock, 1973) (Decker, 2010) (Byrnes, R. M., Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division & Thomas Leiper Kane Collection, 1992).

What the Amin regime brought to Uganda was economic decline, political instability, and many human rights violations. As for the economic variable, the Asian community was the main financial engine of the country, and with Amin's desire for an all-black territory, they were evicted in a rush. Hence, the commercial, industrial and trading sectors they had built mainly were over with the expellings. Amin replaced the people who fled the country with illiterate people to be in positions of power or to be the owners of the properties they had left. President Amin also used most of the country's wealth to "better equip" the soldiers by buying expensive hardware. Amin tried to show the army as part of the people so the population would willingly be on his side, but people feared them. On the political aspect, any person with Obote or that did not accept what Amin had to say had to leave the country if they did not want to die painfully. The regime decided to put military personnel for the court of law on the judicial posts, eliminating civil courts. There were also continuous purges for soldiers or civilians that were not respecting the military discipline Amin imposed. (Nayenga, 1979) (Kreimer, A.; World Bank, 2000) (Byrnes, R. M., Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division & Thomas Leiper Kane Collection, 1992).

As established before, the tribes that suffered the most because of Amin's brutality were the Langi and the Acholi. Amin was the controller of the direct agenda of lawmaking and absolute leader. His men changed the country's structure from a hostile but livable

environment to a culture of intimidation and threats. That was not only represented in the leadership, but in a micro-perspective, people were also changing to follow a *food chain* pattern in which Decker (2010) explains: "Mid-level officials threatened lower-level officials. Property owners threatened their residents. Men threatened women. **Nearly everyone seemed to be grasping for power by intimidating their subordinates**" (Decker, 2010).

Saul (1976) analyzes in the Ugandan case that the British's legacy created a fractured society. They were taught through their actions that the only way to have wellbeing -politically, socially, economically not only for oneself but for their tribe- was to divide the rest or make coalitions (just like Obote and the Acholi or Amin and the Lugbara and the Madi) to control everything as an intra-class competition of the winner-gets-all phenomenon that was tearing the country apart. Nevertheless, it was not only the act of climbing this stair to total control but also doing whatever it was possible to push the rest down. Furthermore, that is a textbook example of what Amin did; during his regime, he heard that the Acholi were getting together with underground guerrillas to fight his power, and he took his armed force to Acholiland to proceed with killings, civilian harassment, and rape, which occurred all too often during the Amin Regime. It is estimated that between 50,000 and 300,000 civilians were killed during the eight years of the regime (Short, 1971) (Saul, 1976) (Kasozi, 1994).

Wendt (1992) explains with his three identity groups, by taking the Hobbesian identity, explains why the tribes that were holding power wanted the "weaker" ones or the "traitors" -according to Amin- to disappear or cease to exist. Under this type of identity, a person/group only cares about one's survival. Because the social process and the institutions created at the beginning of colonialism were the only types of "formal" social processes they knew, they just replicated what they were taught for better or worse. This social process can also be seen through

Onuf's perspective (1989) that we are an accumulation of history and events, and Ugandans only knew that. (Onuf, 1989) (Reus-Smit, 1999) (Wendt, 1992) (Kasozi, 1994).

However, one of the bases of Constructivism is that we can consciously choose to change ourselves and, therefore, the course of action. Whether it was Obote or Amin, they could have changed the way the country was being led, and they could have thought that the bloodshed was enough, and it all had to stop, creating a livable environment, but they did not. They only considered their interests, so the country ended up with hatred from all-sided. (Onuf, 1989) (Ruggie, 1998) (Wendt, 1992).

Amin's terror regime came to an end in 1979 when he fled the country and former president Dr. Milton Obote returned to the country seeking his previous post.

2.2.2 Obote II: the final gap breaches with the Ugandan Bush War

One could say that at the end of Idi Amin's dictatorship, Uganda was already hanging on a fine threat, but their situation indeed worsened.

Dr. Obote was exiled in Tanzania during Amin's regime. While Obote was there, he got together with the Tanzania People's Defense Force (TPDF) to help him go back to power. Meanwhile, in Uganda, people against Amin indeed created underground guerrillas, including the Acholi and the Langi; they called these groups the Ugandan National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A), the Save Uganda Movement (SUM), and the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA). Obote also received the support of Tanzanian President Nyerere because he was seeking a stable governmental structure in the neighboring country, directly impacting his own country's stability (Campbell, 1980).

Obote had the firm belief that even if he was put in power by the military forces, he was a civilian ruling the country, so he arranged democratic elections. However, according to the national surveys, he was not going to win, and to avoid embarrassment, both the UNLF/A and the TPDF controlled the elections from the inside. They also went to the populations and harassed them into voting for their candidate and made it seem like Milton Obote won the power through the ballot. Since the first day Obote got to power for his second administration, a southerner former military, Yoweri Museveni, declared that he was creating the National Resistance Army (NRA). The NRA's main goal was to overthrow Obote's administration, which started the Ugandan Bush War. The reason why Museveni wanted this was that Obote was corrupt, nepotist and he neglected the south. Obote quickly reacted to this by recruiting all the Langi and Acholi people -minors, older men, women, every person that was able to fight- to be trained and to fight by his side (Byrnes, R. M., Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division & Thomas Leiper Kane Collection, 1992) (World Peace Foundation, 2015).

Even if these tribes were subject to severe purges under the Amin regime, they performed similar actions against southern tribes without a trace of empathy for them the same year of Obote's return to power. From Museveni's side, they were also recruiting people from the rural areas of the southern tribes, and the NRA numbers rapidly increased from the hundreds to the thousands in a matter of days. (Kasozi, 1994) (Byrnes, R. M., Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division & Thomas Leiper Kane Collection, 1992).

These two divisions began activities to discredit the other party; as for the Obote's army's coalition, they dispersed throughout the country, especially to the south, to wear the clothing of NRA and create chaos to fund the ideal that only Dr. Obote would save the nation. The National Resistance Army tried to do some damage control by officially listing all their recruits and

putting a roof on the number of people that would fight for the NRA (5,500 people). A "third actor," some politicians believed that the country could be governed under a multiparty system, which both sides did not accept. Both sides started to engage in multiple killings, abductions, disappearances, rapes, and burglaries to discredit the others. These acts were happening during the months before the civil war "officially" began in February 1981. (Kasozi, 1994).

Coined as the Ugandan Bush War, this war lasted for five years until Obote left power. During this war, the level of violence was high, and the country was in constant bloodshed. This war was everyone fighting everyone, it was the government against the guerrillas, the guerrillas against the other guerrillas, against the government, and all civilians were subjects. Because of their ethnicities, the tribes had to choose sides: all southern tribes -including Buganda- were with Museveni. The Langi, the Acholi, and the Tanzanian forces were protecting Obote. In this period, if a person said they thought there were guerrilla men from the opposing faction in the area, they would enter houses, kill people, rape women, arrest men and allot their properties. (Kasozi, 1994).

The number of victims of the war was so high that there was no ground enough to bury all the bodies, and they were left out in the open, decomposing daily. The Obote government saw all Buganda people as possible enemies. Young boys of this mentioned tribe that would barely be of age to fight in the war were counted as possible people to be in the guerrilla and were murdered to avoid them joining the NRA. The number of Human Rights violations and murdered people could even be classified as genocide. The Obote regime would go to different country places with several trucks, buses, and others, shout "*Panda Gari*" -a Kiswahili expression meaning get aboard- and took the people elsewhere. The survival rate of these targets of these operations was less than ten percent. One must also add that the people who were directly

affected by this and the Ugandan Bush War created a displacement problem; almost 750,000 people had to leave their houses because of the closeness of the combats. This war was merely the aftermath of the human ambition of seizing power, no matter how they got it. (Kasozi, 1994) (Byrnes, R. M., Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division & Thomas Leiper Kane Collection, 1992) (Kanyeihamba, 2010) (World Peace Foundation, 2015) (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2010).

The National Resistance Army, led by Museveni, finally turned the nation against Obote and performed a final *coup d'état* against the Obote dictatorship, ending with the war. Museveni's NRA has been in power since 1985, putting the south in charge of the country. After the five years of war, one of the most affected tribes was the Acholi, not only because of the people that directly fought in the war but the victims of the NRA attacks. Internationally, there has been much worry because of the lack of Human Rights that the nation has been suffering. Back in 1984, a group of experts in London discussed it, but no action was taken. As Kanyeihamba (2010) mentions, the leaders did not learn from the past and perpetuated violence against the tribes. If we could compare, the number of people fleeing Amin's Uganda was 25,000, while in Obote's Uganda, it was 280,000, almost tenfold of the previous dictatorship (Kanyeihamba, 2010) (World Peace Foundation, 2015) (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2010).

2.2.3 Yosef Museveni: the end of the peace with the north

As it became a tradition in Uganda, the ruling of Yoweri Museveni came as a part of an act of vengeance against those that were against him, meaning the Langi and the Acholi. According to Museveni, his NRA won because of their organization, correctness in their actions,

and accurate political activities. Even if there was still some violence against these two tribes mentioned, it was lesser than in Amin's (1971-1979) and Obote II (1980-1985). Nevertheless, more than the violent actions, the Acholi and the Langi were worried because of what already happened when Amin was presiding over the country. As it has been repeated in their history, they once again thought they were doomed by being ruled by a southerner. Museveni, in his speech, mentioned his intention of *de-ethnicized* the national politics but clearly started to give more advantages to the southern tribes and slaughtering, abducting, arresting, and beating the northern populations. (Kisekka-Ntale & Doro, 2014) (Atkinson, 2009) (Kasozi, 1994) (Kanyeihamba, 2010).

Museveni has been in charge since 1986, beginning his latest presidency term in May of 2021, so he would be president at least until 2026; these dates would mark 40 years of his ruling of the nation. (Al Jazeera, 2021).

This subchapter's importance lies in how politics have worked since the beginning of this country and how it has shaped the social relationships between one and others. It has been a society that is as divided as they come; and had only in mind their way to the power, no matter who or how. As we had stated before, they have a Hobbesian personality that one has to eliminate one's enemies, or one will cease to exist. (Wendt, 1992) (Reus-Smit, 1999). We will see how and why the Lord's Resistance Army was created in the following subchapter with these foundations.

2.3 Lord's Resistance Army

This subchapter seeks to establish the creation of the Lord's Resistance Army as an ethnic defense group. In the following, we will discuss its creator and the LRA's actions before becoming a terrorist organization.

2.3.1 Creation of the Lord's Resistance Army

2.3.1.1 Joseph Kony: leader and creator of the LRA, his goals and actions

Joseph Kony was born in the first years of the 1960s; no one knows precisely when; he is a member of the northern tribe Acholi. As previously mentioned, with the arrival of the British colonizers, there were also many religious missions of various religions. The Christian missions influenced the Acholi; thus, Kony is a fervent Christian since his early years. One mentioned when he was born because he has only known the colonial environment that the Britons set and, afterward, the ongoing socio-political crisis that his country, especially his tribe, had gone through. All the way through the highs of Obote's first regime, to the massacre that his clan suffered from Amin, then to the Acholi's fight and power once again with the second Obote regime, and lastly, the fear that was attached with a southerner being in power for the first time. It is essential to study this history as it was the history that shaped Kony's personality and ideals. We could say his decisions could have a foundation in the cumulus of Ugandan history and events that shaped it. (Fiber, 2017) (Abe, 2014) (Atkinson, 2009) (Onuf, 1989).

When Kony was a school-aged boy, we must also remember that education was part of the religious missions; he decided to drop out of his education to search more about traditional medicine methods used in his tribe. (Abe, 2014). That must have been at the time of Amin's dictatorship. After some years, at the beginnings of Obote's second regime and the Ugandan

Bush War, his Acholi cousin, Alicia Auma -later Alicia Lakwena- decided to create the Holy Spirit Movement. The HSM was an ethnic defense group mixed with mysticism as Lakwena affirmed that by joining her group, the Holy Spirit -hence the name- would protect their people against the bullets. (Fiber, 2017) (Abe, 2014).

In 1986, when Museveni became president, Lakwena decided to flee to Kenya. That is when Kony took a leadership role in his tribe and creating his own group, Lord's Resistance Army, mentioning that he was a self-claimed Messiah that was there to save his people and pushed the Acholi towards total control of the nation, stating that they must create a government following the Ten Commandments to be saved truly. That is the beginning of the ethnic defense group Lord's Resistance Army. This group started with the primary mission of defending the Acholi against any possible action that Museveni could take and perpetuate history by trying to get a clan to the power to push down the others. When Kony stated that multiple spirits possessed him, he played a mind-of-God complex that "enabled" him to profess the good things. However, it also liberates him of the guilt of doing whatever he seems fit for his purpose of expressing the superior being's sayings. (Abe, 2014) (Fiber, 2017) (Atkinson, 2009) (Dunn, 2004) (Tesemma, 2013).

As one could analyze, Kony's identity values were tied to the concept that the only way to live was to conquer others, but also the urge of protecting his family of the atrocities they had passed with previous regimes -both the British and Amin-. That is why he decided to take action because he was pushed to it. As Reus-Smit (1999), our identity is our being and acting. Also, as Ruggie (1998) explains, our identity is bound by our experiences and the time we live in. Perhaps if Kony were born decades before or after this time of history, he would have taken different decisions, or even he would have been presented with different choices than the ones he

was dealing with. Therefore, Kony acted upon the world he had socially been presented (the agencies that then existed); he did not see it as a choice but as a duty because his country's events directly influenced him. (Abe, 2014)(Ruggie, 1998) (Onuf, 1989) (Wendt, 1992) (Reus-Smit, 1999).

The LRA's numbers quickly increased between 1987 and 1988, with the same Acholi people and members of Lukwena's former Holy Spirit Movement and other smaller Acholi guerrillas such as the Ugandan People's Democratic Army groups that were created between the Ugandan Bush War and the ascension of Museveni. (Dunn, 2004).

As stated, the LRA's main social goal was to defend its tribe against the attacks from the NRA, but also the group had the political goal of defeating Museveni so they could take power and have the Acholi as a sole power, but also to stop the religious divisions by imposing a Christian State that would strictly follow the Ten Commandments. However, Kony thought that before they could do so, his tribe must have a cleanse of those that did not follow the Christian teachings -such as those Acholi that only followed their traditional religion or believes-. At that time, the same group that swore to protect the Acholi was the same slaughtering them. (Atkinson, 2009) (Abe, 2014) (Dunn, 2004) (Invisible Children, n.d).

2.3.1.2 The Lord's Resistance Army first years

It was no more than a couple of months that the LRA changed from being an ethnic defense group to a rouge guerrilla. In this initial ethnic cleanse from the "dirty ones," the members of the LRA started to kill, rape, and mutilate their people. The Acholi people that were not part of this group quickly started to resent them because of their brutal actions. In 1989, the first encounter with the now-renamed NRA as the Ugandan People's Defense Forces -UPDF- and

the violence spike, with what was named the Northern Uganda War. (Atkinson, 2009) (Ehrenreich, 1998) (Van Acker, 2004).

Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army allies changed their objectives and goals at some point between creating the group and 1990; they were apparently no longer trying to seize power but rather to survive as a group. Here another actor enters this conflict, Sudan, with whom the Northern Uganda War would take another direction, an international conflict where the LRA would act as gunmen and strengthen their guerrilla status. (Van Acker, 2004).

The objective of the present chapter was to examine the history of the place where the Lord's Resistance Army was created as an influence for the formation of said organization. Hence, as a summary of the LRA's first years, we could see their initial goal had a perfect reason for their existence -the defense of its people- but then, as a secondary goal, they had the reach of Ugandan executive power. However, at the same time, because of Kony's constant discussions with the Holy Ghost -*Tipu Maleng* in their language-, his guerrilla attacked the same people they vowed to defend. Thus, many authors believe Joseph Kony is, first of all, a madman and a person that was defined by victimhood, and the LRA story is considered one of a group that had no reason for being after some months because they lost their direction. The existence of the LRA at that point became a story of survival and mass atrocities. (Jackson, 2010) (Van Acker, 2004) (Dunn, 2004) (Ehrenreich, 1998).

In this chapter, we analyzed the Ugandan history, first with the British colonization in the land of Uganda, at a time when they divided the land as they reckoned best for their interest and their allies, the Kingdom of Buganda, without regard of the tribes' sayings. Then, they dominated the clans through violence and psychologically changed them by saying the Africans were

second-class citizens. At the end of the 1800s, religious missions from the Jews, Muslims, Catholics, and Christians arrived in this territory, influencing different tribes with their preaching. Simultaneously, the British Empire divided the nation into productive and labor zones, which would be south and north. Because of it and its advantages to Buganda, this created a North-South conflict between the tribes. When the independence arrived, so did the internal conflict. In the following subchapter, we studied Milton Obote, a northerner Langi, who got power after independence and alliance with a similar tribe, the Acholi. During this regime, they abused their power over the rest of the tribes, and people feared them.

One of Obote's protégés was Idi Amin, a young boy that escalated the military to the top. The following subchapter focuses on Amin, a Kakwa descendant who decided to stage a coup d'état against Obote in 1971. He followed the same pattern of abuse as Obote, but this time against the Langi and the Acholi. Amin had a terror regime for eight years, which was marked by violence, evictions, economic and social decline. The subsequent subchapter is set in 1980 when Obote returned to power with the help of the Tanzanian People Democratic Forces -TPDF- and other guerrillas. Milton Obote maintained the same arrangement with the Acholi, and both tribes quickly abused power once again. Then, a southern leader, Yoweri Museveni, declared his intentions of taking Obote out of power. That began the Ugandan Bush War, where both sides, north, and south, were deeply affected by looting, rapes, mass murders, and disappearances. This war ended in 1986 with the rise of Museveni as president. In the last part of the chapter, one investigates Joseph Kony, a young Acholi man, decided to create a defense group for his tribes because of the violence from the president and NRA. Kony, who has lived his whole life in this country violence, had a goal of fighting Museveni's regime and put the Acholi to power. Religion also plays a vital role in his story as the Christian missions influenced his tribe. The Lord's

Resistance Army had the objective of establishing a nation following the Ten Commandments. Kony and his LRA rapidly turned against their own people because, according to Kony, the Holy Spirit demanded a cleanse of the dirty people. For the analysis of this chapter, we used the Constructivism theory of Onuf, Wendt, Ruggie, and Reus-Smit to depict how history shaped the actions of the mentioned actors and how it defined their beings, from British colonialism to Kony.

CHAPTER THREE

3 LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY: TERROR OF THE SOCIETY

This chapter aims to have an understanding of the LRA after the first years of its creation. In the first section, one will explain the period from 1990 until 1999 where the group started to be an actor in the Sudanese conflict, them being the main allies of the Government of Sudan. Then, one will give a scope of what the Nairobi Agreement is and how it changed the LRA's course of action after this agreement. It is at this point where one will analyze the definition of terrorism for Schmid (2011) and Vinci ((2005) and the actions of the LRA to define if they classified as a terrorist organization or not. The next part of the chapter talks about the International Criminal Courts case against Kony and the other four top leaders of the group. Following that, one will analyze how some international actors see terrorism and how they classified the LRA. In the final part of the chapter, one will have a brief outlook of the estimated numbers as a consequence of the LRA's thirty-five-year existence in Uganda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo- DRC-, the Central African Republic- CAR-, and South Sudan.

3.1 The Lord's Resistance Army illegal and violent doing

In this subchapter, one will focus on the period from 1990 onwards, the conflict between the UPDF, the Sudanese government, and the LRA, where the GoS (Government of Sudan) turned into the financial backbone of the armed group. The importance of this conflict lies in the last period where the LRA could be considered a guerrilla group but not as a terrorist organization yet.

3.1.1 LRA's intervention in the Sudanese conflict

In 1990, the northern Uganda war became a violent north-south conflict. However, another actor made this an international conflict. Uganda's northern neighbor Sudan (then comprised by what is now South Sudan and Sudan), in 1990, was fighting its own conflict with the southern Sudanese rebels that wanted to get their independence. This dispute began in the decade of 1950, but the Sudanese government controlled the conflict by providing autonomy to their southern region. However, it intensified in 1989 as the southerners demanded their independence. (Ochan, 2009) (Vinci, 2005).

Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir decided to take advantage of the closeness of Acholiland to the territory where the southern rebels were located. He made a deal with the LRA, where the GoS would become the financial backbone of the organization as long as they eliminated as many rebels as possible. (A similar agreement was made between Museveni and the south rebels -the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), where the UPDF would give them military and economic support). The LRA gladly accepted, and it is at this point where they start to terrorize the Acholi. Because they needed the *workforce*, Kony and his men went to little villages to force children -from seven or eight years and older- to go with them, and before abducting them, he would force them to kill their parents with a rifle. That was something that happened every day in different cities, terrorizing the surrounding villages as they could be the next. The boys were quickly trained as child soldiers, and girls were forced to be sex slaves or child brides for the members of the LRA. (Ochan, 2009) (Pham, Vinck, & Stover, 2007).

When the violent actions started, as the LRA did not have the population support, they had to resort to violence, not only against the South Sudanese rebels but also to recruit new soldiers and keep the current. In the early years of the 90s, children that would have been able to escape wandered around Gulu looking for someone to help them or even if there was family around -let us remember that the first thing the children had to do was to kill their parents- without knowing whom they were before being abducted- (Pham, Vinck, & Stover, 2007).

The LRA's deal with the government of Sudan was very lucrative for them, not only money-wise, but they also gave them weapons and military logistics. It got to the point where Kony became al-Bashir's right hand. The LRA left Acholiland in northern Uganda to move their bases to southern Sudan with the clearance from Khartoum (capital of Sudan), so they could kill the southern rebels at ease. However, their job was also to disturb the villages/camps where they were located and take away their food, water, and medicine to have fewer opportunities for survival. The ones in charge of these operations were the child soldiers as they were seen as nothing else that workforce that could be replaced with another batch of abductions, or in the long term, the children born from the sex slaves would also become LRA soldiers. This last idea was brought by Kony as he was seeking for his descendants to replace the dirty ones; that is why many of the abducted young girls were his wives and should have as many kids as possible. Joseph Kony wanted to become the "Adam" of the Acholi. As far as the ones at the top of the organization, they never left the camps and were always protected by their soldiers. (Ochan, 2009) (Pham, Vinck, & Stover, 2007) (Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2010) (Tesemma, 2013).

This fruitful agreement between the LRA and the GoS would last about a decade after international pressure forced both countries to sign what would be called the Nairobi Agreements.

The importance of stating the relationship between the LRA and the Government of Sudan was because the GoS gave the organization means of survival, as well as they validated their agency, hence their identity and actions; perhaps if the GoS did not approach the LRA, the armed group would have disappeared or taken a different path. This also backs Wendt's (1992) reasoning that the search for **power, wealth and security** is an outcome of our preexisting ideas; thus, the means to get them might vary to get the results. When talking about identity construction, we can talk about the creation of the group to defend the Acholi but as well as a means to get to power, which would directly involve security. Afterward, we can analyze that the group deconstructed their identity -they stopped being a defense group but instead just searched for power, no matter how-, which led to their identity reconstruction. (Wendt, 1992) (Ruggie, 1998).

3.1.2 The Nairobi Agreements between Sudan and Uganda

The Nairobi Agreements was a multi-year process between the government of Sudan led by Omar al-Bashir, the government of Uganda guided by Yoweri Museveni, and as witnesses of the process, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter through his nongovernmental organization, The Carter Center, and the president of Kenya, Daniel Moi. This document stipulated that they would respect the borders and sovereignty of their countries, not interfering in the other's country conflicts. Also, this agreement shows that they would stop arming the LRA -from Sudan's side- and the SPLA- from Uganda's side- and that they would try to disarm and disband those who had

already acquired weapons from the military. However, the Nairobi Agreements do not only talk about the weapons, but it explicitly mentions that each country would immediately stop the logistic, military, and financial support. An addendum of this document mentions that the GoS would allow Museveni and the UPDF to conduct military operations on their soil so they could hunt down the LRA. The rest of the agreement states that they would do everything possible to mend their relationships as countries; they would return the war prisoners that each country held and would let both UNICEF and the Carter Center help in the reestablishment of those that were directly and indirectly affected by this conflict (United Nations Peacemaker, 1999) (Schomerus, 2012).

As he had become al-Bashir's right hand, Joseph Kony felt disrespected by not being invited to the negotiations as he felt that his group was directly involved. He mentioned that this agreement did not exist because he was not in it. Nevertheless, they quickly left their bases in Sudan as the UPDF would hunt them down in this territory, and they left to other neighboring countries (Schomerus, 2012).

At this point in time, the Lord's Resistance Army would stop being a guerrilla group but a terrorist organization. Among their first actions as a terrorist group, they expanded to other three countries so they would no longer be traced.

3.2 LRA shift from a guerrilla to a terrorist group.

This subchapter aims to explain the LRA's shift from guerrilla to a terrorist organization, explaining the actions they took part in and why there are terrorists, this will be studied through Schmid (2011) and Vinci (2005). Afterward, one will study the case between the International

Criminal Court and Kony et al. The final part of the subchapter will analyze how the international community defines terrorism and how they classify the LRA under their definitions.

3.2.1 LRA expansion to the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic

First, to explain why one could consider the Lord's Resistance Army actions after 1999 as a terrorist organization and not as a guerrilla anymore, one has to point out the differences between these two, guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

When one talks about guerrilla warfare, one talks about a group that uses violence as a means of mobilization. However, its target is to fight directly with the other party, and the civilians are casualties or means to get to that target; they might ambush to try to weaken the other party or provoke them. In the LRA's case, first, it was against Uganda, and then when the GoS hired them as hitmen and rioters to weaken the Sudan rebels for them to give up. However, when one speaks about terrorism, it is the specific use of violence to psychologically terrorize the population, not only about the physical attacks but the subconscious thought of being next. A significant difference between guerrilla and terrorism is that of the attacks; in guerrilla warfare, its goals are mostly "enemies on active duty," whereas, in terrorism, the victims are mostly civilians. As Schmid (2011) also studies, the victims of such attacks act as the target of opportunity but are not the final goal. The final objective is the target of attention -the public and certain people- to stimulate the thought of the continuous existence of the terrorist group, giving the message that they are still there and could attack at any time and any place. Both could use the same tactics, such as abducting and killing, but their main difference eradicates in the "why" of the action. Hoffman (Hoffman in Moghadam, 2015) also adds that the goals between the one

and the other are somewhat different; in terrorism, they no longer have the goal of seizing a territory but proclaiming their beliefs. In contrast, the guerrillas do try to seize the power of the place where they are acting (Moghadam, 2015) (Tamer, 2017) (Schmid, 2011).

We could say the LRA turned into a terrorist organization at the end of the alliance with the GoS because they were strategically using fear of many populations so no one could catch them, therefore, being able to survive as a group. Before that, yes, the LRA used many horrible tactics, but it did not intend to cause terror; it was a means to an end, whereas the actions that one will describe in the following pages had the goal of causing fear to people.

When the alliance between the Government of Sudan and the LRA ended, the Lord's Resistance Army had to look for other ways of surviving as a group, as the UPDF were hunting them down, and their financial donor was no longer with them. So what they decided to do is to strategically use tactics so the people would fear them, meaning they would not tell the UPDF troops where they were located.

As the group was no longer welcomed in Sudan as the decade before, they mobilized from country to country, so it would be difficult for the UPDF to catch them. Their routes expanded to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). As previously mentioned, one of their ways to build their numbers was through abduction, and they continued to do so but in a different way. It has been described that many LRA's cars would arrive in a town, they would locate all the children, and then they had to kill their parents and lick their brains, drink their blood, and eat the flesh of their parents' corpses, after all this traumatizing process, they would abduct them. That started to happen on a daily basis, but as they had their camps in 4 countries, no one knew which village or town would be next. A

phenomenon began then named “the night commute” where the parents would send their children at night to hide in the bushes the whole night until sunrise if they were not nearby a city. If the rural village had an urban city close by, then the children would have to walk after the sunset to the city and sleep there. Therefore, if their village were the one the LRA was attacking, they would not find many children there. There are only estimated numbers of the children that have been abducted; some mention as “little” as 10,000; others estimate around 40,000-50,000. The latest number range projected by the United Nations is between 60,000 and 100,000 children. (Vinci, 2005) (Pham, Vinck, & Stover, 2007) (Auletta-Young, Maclin, Kelly, & Cragin, 2015).

Vinci (2005) claims that the reason why the Lord’s Resistance Army can be classified as a terrorist because they use terror as their principal strategy; their actions are not about the actions themselves, but the psychological message that they carry. For example, one of the LRA’s essential activities throughout the years is the looting of villages. However, afterward, they would burn down the entire village because this causes more sensationalism in the media, sending the message of “either you are with us, or you suffer the consequences.” To spread this message further, they have porters, who are temporarily abducted and forced to carry the LRA’s equipment and then be killed or freed. With this, if they survive, they will tell other people what they lived/suffered, magnifying the group’s message and the threat they represent (Vinci, 2005) (Dubal, 2018).

Other routine activities of the LRA are mutilating ears, lips, noses, fingers, hands, or legs as they are quite visible body organs to mark them as symbols of maximum threat. Something related they used to do, was to sew lips, eyes & ears together and attach letters to these, mentioning “we will do the same to all of you.” The lips and ears have a symbolic meaning of

information because one speaks and hears things (if you inform us, you will be tortured or dead). The eyes were a symbol of never saying anything one saw and, once again, do not inform on us. The people who have their arms/fingers mutilated were the ones who were writers in the village (do not write about us). The people that had bicycles had their legs mutilated because they saw the bikes as a method of transportation that could quickly alert other close populations, so they mutilated the legs. The LRA would also put random checkpoints between villages to verify that no one would tell on them, therefore controlling the populations. If someone were caught informing about them, they would rape this person -either male or female- in public, so the individual and their family would be publicly shamed. As one can see with these examples, the violence the LRA carried was not about being violent by the message it was sending not only to the target of opportunity -the direct victims- but to the rest of the population and the countries' governments (Vinci, 2005).

One can analyze that the violence they were committing after the alliance with the government of Sudan was a type of violence to be treated as a form of communication and a way of controlling the situation the best they could; so, the rest of the people trying to defeat the LRA would walk away. As Schmid (2011) mentions while analyzing terrorism, one must see that civilians work as a target of opportunity, but they are not the target of demand/attention. Because what they seek is for people's fear, not only the direct victims but also the community, the media, the UPDF, the SPLA, or the guerrillas that were opposing them, and the governments (Schmid, 2011) (Vinci, 2005).

An interesting element started to develop inside the LRA camps, as many kidnapped kids in the 80's/90's were brainwashed inside the camps after their initiation; that was so brutal and traumatic that the abductees would after that psychologically forget absolutely everything.

Among the activities done in the initiation, there would be circle beatings, where they would have to beat dead some abductees, get fifty or more lashes, food deprivation, and harsh punishments or dead in case they tried to escape. (Chatlani, 2007) (Vinci, 2005).

Thus, afterward, they became easier to control, violent, and had wrong ideas to fear going back to society. With all of these, they started to believe in Kony's preaching, and as they have been many years in battle, that was the only place they knew or could remember. So, when they grew, they started to have children, and the LRA became a *community* that they named *Kony Ville* or New Gulu -in reference to the biggest city in Acholiland-. Former LRA soldiers, both male and female, long for the day where they can go back to the camps. Even if they accept that the tactics are harsh, those are necessary for the soul cleanse; they even accept Kony's sayings that they would be accepted in God's heaven after this terranean life because of their magnificent doings on earth. That is a trend that Vinci (2005) describes as a warlord organization, as the organization works for the people within the unit and no longer tries to control territory. That can be partially true, but the former LRA members mention that Kony's final goal is to eventually seize the Ugandan power, only that he is doing it little by little. (Dubal, 2018) (Vinci, 2005) (Tesemma, 2013).

As Schmid (2011) explains, terrorism can be seen through different points of view; it can be a combination of terrorism. It can also be criminal, political, warfare, communication, or serve a religious purpose. In the LRA's case, one could study that it is political because it began with that motive, to defend but also to seize power, this is a goal that has changed through the years, but that is Kony's ultimate goal. It is also communicational, as they use their diverse actions to send a message of "we are still here, present, and do not come for us" to the other parties -armed forces, governments, and the general population of the countries where they are -

Uganda, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and since 2011 when South Sudan became an independent nation as well-. It has a religious purpose, both to set the Ten Commandments and to do their criminal actions in the name of God and the Holy Spirit. They will torture, abduct people in the name of these spiritual entities.

Nevertheless, one must also point out that the LRA also carries their actions as a tool for warfare against their enemies/counterparties. That is one of the reasons it has been so difficult for the five countries to try to stop them. The Lord's Resistance Army uses everything they have to be unpredictable and avoiding the local armed forces. (Schmid, 2011) (Vinci, 2005) (Bevan, 2007).

From the political perspective, the LRA has not only pushed its agenda for themselves but as a consequence of their doings, President Yoweri Museveni and his UPDF have less and less approval. That was due to their inability to protect their citizens from insecurity, so the general population wants them gone because of their lack of action/success against the LRA. Let us remember that one of Kony's political goals was to take power away from Museveni, and he is partially accomplishing that through the LRA's horrific activities (Bevan, 2007).

Alex Schmid (2011), in his masterpiece book "The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research," also explains that not all types of violence can be considered terrorism, as the latter aims to create an environment of constant collective state of fear. The objective of terrorism is the psychological state of mind that people get into because of these groups. As could be seen in the previous paragraphs, that is purposefully what the LRA does. All their actions are calculated to provoke this irrational fear, first, so people do not try to fight them back, but also because they

know that the news of their inhuman actions will be spread all over the region, cause more popular fright (Schmid, 2011).

Other types of activities that can help us considered the LRA as terrorist under Schmid's parameters are the launching of medium-sized grenades in the middle of crowds, buses, taxis, or high traffic roads, and when these explode, then leave the bushes and shoot the vehicles or people around the area. There are two different zones where they plant these grenades in very populated areas to cause fear. The second type of attacks are nearby schools or internally displaced people (IDPs) camps -that have been created as a consequence of this same organization-. They use this type of attack when they are trying to "recruit" children. As it can be seen through these illustrations, the LRA's attacks are not directed at the armed forces but civilians. Schmid (2011) also analyses that when the violence is directed toward civilians and not to the armed forces, the organization can be considered a terrorist because civilians have no direct saying in the conflict. For the LRA, civilians are only seen as needed casualties to spread their message of terror. Vinci (2005) also analyses terrorism with three subdivisions -fear, fright, and anxiety- and this scholar states the LRA fills all three categories because of their various terrifying acts that have brought a collective sense of insecurity and anxiousness, which makes them easier to control and manipulate. As Bevan (2007) explains, the people are bound to the LRA by fear inside and outside the LRA camps. Therefore, the LRA's core uses terror as a force multiplier and their primary defense/offense strategy (Leonard, 2010)(Schmid, 2011) (Vinci, 2005) (Bevan, 2007).

According to Alex Schmid (2011) also states that the terrorist actions do not stop because it becomes the means of survival and profit for that cell. This group is also aware that their activities can escalate a conflict giving them more reasons to continue, making this a cycle with

no exit. As it can be studied with the LRA, one of the only reasons why they are still active is because of the fear they cause with their actions -means of survival-, as well as profitable -deals with the GoS, afterward, because they were moving back and forth between five countries, they could also engage in illegal activities such as ivory trade-. As far as conflicts go, the LRA causes fear and insecurity in the countries where they are, making people mad at their governments because they cannot stop this group, making the sociopolitical reality of those countries very unstable. Even if they do not have political interest in Sudan, South Sudan, DRC, CAR, they want instability to continue in Uganda to capture power somehow (Schmid, 2011) (Leonard, 2010).

Schmid (2011) establishes that a solo act of violence cannot be considered terrorism; therefore, the actions must vary and cycle. In the table below, one will compare said actions and if the LRA has taken part in those or not.

Table #2

Techniques of violence used in terrorism in comparison with the ones used by the Lord's Resistance Army

Techniques used in terrorism, according to Schmid	***Techniques used by the Lord's Resistance Army.***
Mutilation of legs and arms	***Yes, also lips, ears***
Intimidation	***Yes***
Premeditated crimes	***Yes***
Martyrdom	***No***
Political Blackmail	***No***
Kidnapping	***Yes***
Assassination	***Yes***
Arson	***Yes***
Mass-murdering	***Yes***
Poisonings	***No***

Bombings	***Yes***
Torture	***Yes***
Massacres	***Yes***
Use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN)	***No***
Disappearances -a combination of kidnapping, torturing, and murdering-	***Yes***

Source: Schmid (2011); Vinci (2005)

Elaborated by Maria Jose Santamaria

The GoU has created several laws and military operations to decrease the number of people in the LRA and weaken the organization. One of those was the Amnesty Act of 2000, a law for returnees, where soldiers that were part of this group would face no consequences of their actions -murders, kidnappings, rapes- as long as they were in the lower rankings of the group as long as they surrender before 2005. That did not apply to the top tier nor Kony, as he were to be the cause of these horrendous actions. This law did not have the reception they thought it would have, but it is estimated that around 15,000 soldiers agreed to it between the five years it lasted. The military operations Museveni's government has tried were named Operation Iron Fist I & II -the name reflects that Museveni had no intention of negotiating with them-. Museveni publicly stated that they were a success and that the LRA no longer existed, this being a complete lie as the LRA heard of these operations before and left the camps before the UPDF would arrive. These operations killed more than 6,000 IDPs but no members of the LRA (Chatlani, 2007) (Bevan, 2007) (Feldman, 2008).

Even if Yoweri Museveni has repeatedly mentioned that he would not negotiate with the LRA, in 2006, there was an attempt of the ceasefire between the LRA and the UPDF, part of a negotiation called the Juba Talks. However, this negotiation was not fruitful in the end, and then

the attacks from both parties continued. Therefore, Museveni took other political actions, such as making deals with his allies in the DRC, so this government would also mention that the LRA no longer presents a threat, even if most of the LRA attacks since 2008 have been in this country or the Central African Republic. In the neighboring country of Sudan, former allies of the LRA also join the Ugandan military mission to decease the LRA. (Chatlani, 2007) (Feldman, 2008).

The Academic Consensus of the Definition of Terrorism (2011) theorizes that if a group qualifies under the following characteristics, that group is a terrorist group.

1. *The group that carries these criminal activities do them as a tactic of fear generation; these are calculated, premeditated, and do not abide by legal or moral restrictions. These are targeted mainly to civilians/innocent people as part of a propaganda cycle to affect psychologically those around the actions and who do not have a say in the conflict.*

As analyzed in previous paragraphs, that is the *modus operandi* of the Lord's Resistance Army; their attacks are mainly directed to civilians, are premeditated, and do not respect any law or morale. All their criminal activities merely cause general fear; as explained, tactics such as mass-killings, abductions, lootings, public rapes, and mutilations were the primary goal of causing psychological fright most times.

2. *When the violent activities involve physical violence such as the here mentioned -bombings, mass assassination, disappearances, tortures, among others.*

As was exposed in Table # 2, this organization does participate in most of these activities that are considered terrorism.

3. *The victims of such attacks are not the target but act as part of the message to be delivered to the media -for an effect of fear-causing- and the ultimate targets -governments, general population.*

As we could see before, they tried to carry the most impactful activities in the middle of huge crowds or the arson of entire villages because they knew those activities are more impactful on the media. That gave them more chances to spread fear, but also to give the message to the governments that they were pretty present there and that they will not defeat them. Also, returning to the example of the sewed ears or sewed lips with messages saying: “we will do this to all of you.” (Leonard, 2010).

4. *It can be considered when it is under one of the following scenarios: (a) Illegal state repression. (b) Done by a group to disturb the context outside of a conflict or when in peace. (c) As illegal activities supported by third-party actors to influence a situation.*

The Lord’s Resistance Army would fall in category (b), as the group started because of a conflict. However, later, the same group disturbed the peace and created new conflicts with five different governments.

5. *They use this thread of activities as part of a threat-based communication to demand certain things or conditions to the counterparty -government, community, whomever they aim to get- and seek support from those who may agree with the group's ideology.*

As it became clear in former paragraphs, the LRA aims to threaten people or entire communities with many activities. They demand silence and not to inform the government about their whereabouts. Let us remember about the symbolism of the various mutilations.

Dismemberment off the legs of individuals with bicycles so they would not go to the next town and talk. Mutilation of the hands for those that were reporters/local writers -do not write about us-. Lips -do not talk about us-. Among other symbolic activities. (Leonard, 2010)

6. *Terrorist violence is primarily political, social, and ideological. That is the reason why there is no single action but rather a campaign of violence*.

As it could be seen throughout the chapter falls under the three categories, the LRA is deeply political, social, and ideological. Moreover, regarding a campaign of violence, they have had a constant one for around 30 years.

Therefore, one could conclude that the Lord's Resistance Army is indeed a terrorist organization as it fills all the criteria to be considered as such under the Academic Consensus. Furthermore, it is also important to point out what Human Rights they have directly violated based on the Charter of Human Rights. In this document, Article #3 specifies that every individual has the right to live safely and with freedom. The LRA has violated these with their abductées, whose freedom was taken away from the moment they were kidnapped and those populations that are victims of their vicious attacks. These range from the children that had to leave their havens for the night commutes because of the fear to entire communities that live with fright every day hoping the LRA does not get near there because of the mass-murders, lootings, rapings, and mutilations to the more than two million people that had to leave their places because of this organization and had to live in IDPs camps. The thousands of slave soldiers or child brides/mothers that have become the foundation of this group are also victims of the breach of Article # 4, where it is stated that no person can be subject to slavery (United Nations, 1948).

Likewise, Article #5 of this text mentions that no one should suffer from torture or cruel punishment. Rewinding to the methods used by the LRA for its victims, we can see the use of torture, mutilation, rape. To this, we can also add the actions inside the group, where the children were starved, beat, lashed, had to carry attacks against their own families or tribes, or suffered slow deads so that they would be easier to manipulate and make them more violent. That is also correlated to Article #25, where it is specified that every person should have **food**, **housing**, **health,** and **clothing**. Then, one could talk about the LRA's goal of establishing a nation under the Ten Commandments and imposing this belief on their captives. That does not respect the right of free affiliation, including religion, beliefs, or worship (Article #18). Article #2 and #30 of this declaration cite that all these thirty rights are universal and cannot be taken away by any nation, group, or person, no matter the person's background (United Nations, 1948).

It is essential to highlight that while the LRA attacks have decreased since 2014, the group is still active, and no one knows an estimate of how many members are left; some authors in the field approximate a couple of dozens, some others still assess around 400-500. The difficulty in knowing the number of people still in the group is because of the extensive territory they move around. The Crisis Tracker mentions that in the last 365 days -between 2020 & 2021- there have been circa 32 known attacks (Invisible Children & USAID, n.d).

These rights and the activities made throughout decades were the basis of the International Criminal Court's case against the leadership of the LRA, Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen. (Kony et al. Case, 2003).

3.2.2 The Lord's Resistance Army and the International Criminal Court

This subchapter aims to establish the beginnings and the developments of the case between the International Criminal Court (ICC) versus Kony, Otti, Lukwiya, Odhiambo, and Ongwen since the case began and what have been the developments since.

The case "Situation in Uganda," later named Kony et al. began in 2003, when Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni decided to refer this case to the newly created International Criminal Court -ICC-, declaring that the LRA was a much bigger problem than they could handle and were not capable of prosecuting them. The first ruling of the ICC judges was that the case fulfills what is described in the 1992 Rome Treaty and Rome Statute, and they could start with the investigation. One ground rule is that members of the ICC and field soldiers had to go to Uganda to investigate the case themselves. However, Museveni did not want them there and wanted to withdraw his referral, but it was too late; years later, it was found that President Museveni wanted to avoid this because of his own corruption and violent cases. Ugandans did not want the ICC's presence because of the fear of retaliation from the LRA against them, which indeed happened when the ICC first arrived. The LRA augmented their attacks, taking place one of the biggest mass-murders in their history in one of the IDPs camps with more than 250 killed. (Chatlani, 2007) (Allen, 2006) (Happold, 2007).

After a year of field investigation, on the 14th of October 2004, the ICC decided to issue warrants against Joseph Kony as the leader and perpetrator, his second in command Vincent Otti. Two years later, warrants were issued against third in command Raska Lukwiya, fourth in command Okot Odhiambo, and fifth on command Dominic Ongwen. Every warrant explains the different charges and crimes they are accused of. (Allen, 2006)

Joseph Kony was indicted with thirty-seven charges with will be described in Table #3: twelve counts of crimes against humanity and twenty-one charges of war crimes. Otti has thirty-six charges between crimes against humanity and war crimes. Lukwiya had twelve, Odhiambo had eight, and Ongwen has seven. Crimes against humanity for the ICC are those that perpetuate systematic and premeditated attacks against civilians. (Allen, 2006) (International Criminal Court, 2018).

Table #3

Joseph Kony's crimes indicted by the ICC.

Joseph Kony's crimes indicted by the ICC

Crimes Against Humanity	***War Crimes***
Murder (article 7-1-a)	Murder (article 8-2-c-i);
Enslavement (article 7-1-c);	Cruel treatment of civilians (article 8-2-c-i);
Sexual enslavement (article 7-1-g);	Intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population (article 8-2-e-i);
Rape (article 7-1-g);	Pillaging (article 8-2-e-v);
Inhumane acts of inflicting serious bodily injury and suffering (article 7-1-k);	Rape (article 8-2-e-vi)
	Forced enlisting of children (8-2-e-vii).

Source: International Crime Court, 2018

Elabored by Maria Jose Santamaria

Once these warrants were issued, the ICC members left the region, and it was up to the countries' jurisdictions and some help from Interpol by emitting Red Notices to 184 countries to report or capture these five people. Nevertheless, the countries -DRC, CAR, Uganda, Sudan, and since 2011, South Sudan- did not have the resources before nor to apprehend them, so the investigation entered a *cul-de-sac* (Happold, 2007).

Since then, little progress has been made: the case is still in pre-trial as they have not been able to detain the suspects. Two of the suspects have been confirmed as dead (Lukwiya was killed by the UPDF back in 2006, and Odhiambo's corpse was identified through DNA in the Central African Republic back in 2015). In January 2015, one of the suspects, Mr. Dominic Ongwen, a then-9-year-old child abductée in 1987, one year after the LRA's creation, decided to appear before the court voluntarily and is in the ICC's custody. Ongwen's trial would only be against the proved cases where he participated. The case has been on trial since December 2016. In May 2021, he was charged with twenty-five years of prison in the ICC's detention center. In May 2021, Ongwen presented an appeal, but it is yet unknown when that would happen. As far as Vincent Otti and Joseph Kony, they are still active at large in the region, and their trial is still waiting for actions because the ICC does not have trials unless the suspects and their defense is in the courtroom. As an additional note, the International Criminal Court does not have a definition of terrorism as it was too difficult to settle in the terms. Hence, the gravest charges are crimes against humanity and war crimes; the sentence for these depend on the gravity and amount of acts committed, for which the ICC judges will establish the years of conviction. The sentence has to be executed at the ICC detention centers. (The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, 2015) (Happold, 2007) (International Criminal Court, 2021) (International Criminal Court, 2021) (International Criminal Court, n.d) (Wertheim, 2003).

If we backtrack to Onuf's wordings, our decisions, perspectives, and interests are systematically bound to our social background. In the case of Ongwen, he suffered by then replicated the actions that he was taught. By no means should one excuse Ongwen's actions as a grown person, but it is also important to mention his background and the agency that he was forced to belong to from his childhood. In the beginning, he must have followed the rules they gave him as means of survival, but at a certain point, he just mirrored the actions of the other and became part of him. One could never know what person he would have become if he was not abducted or even if he were in another place. (Onuf, 1989) (Reus-Smit, 1999).

3.2.3 International regards on the LRA

The Lord's Resistance Army's long existence has made the group a known organization around the world. In the following subchapter, one will explore the perspectives and actions of different countries or identities about this group, such as the United States, the European Union, the African Union, and the United Nations.

To begin with, the United States of America (USA) has defined terrorism under two categories, the first international terrorism, and the second domestic terrorism. The former is demarcated as crime or dangerous acts to the human life propagated or sponsored by individuals inside a foreign terrorist organization outside of the territory of action. In contrast, the latter is specified as criminal acts inside the nation with religious, racial, social, or political motives. According to this definition, the motives for both types are coercions, influence by intimidation, and affect the government through mass murders. There is no specification of what activities are seemed as dangerous or criminal. (U.S. Government, 2009) (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d).

In 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, the US government created a list of terrorist organizations where the LRA was included. Then, the first time this nation took presence in the region for this conflict was back in 2008 in DRC, after the support asked by GoU President Museveni and Congolese President Kabila for "Operation Lighting Thunder" with US military agents in the field and the UPDF. This operation aimed to destroy the LRA camps in DCR, apprehend the leadership, and rescue as many people as possible. As has happened before with Operation Iron First I & II, the discourse was that the operation was a success when it did almost no harm to this organization. The US withdrew its forces three months later. (Happold, 2007)(Matti, 2012) (Atkinson, Lacaille, Cakaj, & Lancaster, 2012).

Afterward, under President Obama's administration (2009-2017), the executive sent a letter to Congress about the LRA pressing situation, which made the path for the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act. There it is stated that they would give military support to counter the LRA and financial help to the local entities that have been affected by the group. Their official motives were that they saw these efforts as essential to bring international and regional stability and an end to the long-lasting conflict as the local governments have not provided safety to their populations. This accord brought mixed reactions throughout the globe; some academic specialists saw the US intervention as more negative than positive. Meanwhile, the affected communities, the ICC, and NGOs such as Human Rights Watch -HRW- saw it as a step in the right direction. If one could analyze this act 10 years after it has passed, one could have a rather minimal balance, the US government has made little progress in stopping the group, and the economic aid has been less than notorious. The military forces re-entered Uganda in 2010, and they have been present since then. President Trump mentioned back in 2017 that this operation would continue as it was helping the local situation, but there is no

factual data to prove that claim. (Atkinson, Lacaille, Cakaj, & Lancaster, 2012) (Allen-Ebrahimian, 2017) (Arieff, Ploch Blanchard, & Husted, 2015).

In its counter-terrorism strategy, the European Union defines terrorism as a threat to human rights, freedoms, security, and dignity by affecting their physical and psychological integrity. In contrast to the US definition, the EU does explain what activities they consider as acts of terrorism, such as assassination, bodily harm, kidnapping, threats to people, or property destruction by using standard weapons or CBN weapons. The EU counter-terrorism strategy has four pillars: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response. These are seen as a path, future prevention of terrorist organizations through the combat of radical recruits. Protection inside and outside of their borders when there is an attack, pursue -before and after attacks- by dismantling networks, economic means, weapons, and plans. The final step is the response after an attack by sharing information and giving military support to catch the perpetrators (Council of the European Union, 2001) (Council of the European Union, 2005).

The European Union decided to support the situation in Central Africa to eliminate the LRA in 2011; they decided to give their support through economic, military, and intelligence efforts. It also pledged to give humanitarian aid to the most affected communities by the organization. They also push for the apprehension of Joseph Kony and the leadership to compensate for their atrocious crimes. For these purposes, they have donated around twelve million euros through the years. In 2012, the EU decided to join the African Union initiative named “Regional Cooperation Initiative for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army,” also giving economic and military support. In March 2016, the EU listed the LRA as a dangerous terrorist organization and began to concentrate its efforts on CAR for the detention of Kony.

(Council of the European Union, 2016) (Council of the European Union, 2014) (Council of the European Union, 2012).

The African Union -AU- delineated terrorism in their Convention of Prevention and Combating of Terrorism as any illegal act that will cause severe violation of peace, security, development, and human rights through the endangerment of life, integrity, or freedom, as well as any person or group that may damage public or private assets, natural and environmental resources or cultural heritage. The AU vows to take all necessary measures to protect their populations from the violence of terrorism; they would do so through the identification, confiscation, detection, and seizing of funds and weapons. The African Union also mentions that there are two types of terrorism: internal and external factors. In external factors is established as terrorism sponsored by foreign policies -such as third-party countries that pay an organization to be terrorist-. Whereas in internal terrorism, these groups were developed because of domestic conditions such as ethnic persecution, religious harassment, political or governmental repression, or economic scarcity. The Lord's Resistance Army would fall into this category (Organization of African Unity, 2004) (Organization of African Unity, 2015).

In 2012, the African Union, after four years of attempts, finally deployed a Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA (RCI-LRA). It is also essential to add that the LRA has been classified terrorist by the AU from many years ago before this initiative, and it is categorized as the number one priority for the AU. The RCI-LRA has support from the UN, the USA, and the EU. The RCI-LRA has two axes; the first is the military force with around 5,000 individuals. The second one is non-military, where they try to gather materials from national and international sources.

Nevertheless, the UN also added a program of development and assistance to victims and added the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program for the lower ranks on the group and resettlement and reintegration activities for the most affected communities. Once again, the leadership was not taken into account for the DDR. According to the RCI-LRA, the significant triumphs for this joint initiative have been the decrease of attacks from the LRA around 30%-40%, on a daily basis; it has slowly and progressively been less, even though there still are attacks but not the frequency as before. However, according to Cakaj & Lancaster (2012), the RCI-LRA has not done such a good job as they make it seem because they have poor logistics, political challenges and are practically only giving speeches but nothing else; as far as the reintegration and resettlement for the victims and communities, there are virtually none. In 2019 the RCI-LRA stated that the financial, social, and political burden are factors that stop them from organizing large operations against the LRA, but that their managing of the situation has been praised around the globe. They would be more focused on regional stability, peace, and security, with 5,000 personnel on task. (Organization of African Unity, 2015) (World Peace Foundation, 2015) (African Union Peace and Security, 2015)(Auletta-Young, Maclin, Kelly, & Cragin, 2015) (Atkinson, Lacaille, Cakaj, & Lancaster, 2012) (Okeke, 2019).

The United Nations does not currently have a definition of terrorism because of the complexity of the issue. However, they do have the Counter-Terrorism Center -UNCTC- since 2011, which is not as effective as it should because of the same reason that there is no definition of terrorism. Because of the same reason, they do not have a list of terrorist organizations (Saul, 2021) (United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, 2018).

Nevertheless, they have classified the LRA as a violent rebel group, and Joseph Kony is part of the UN Security Council Consolidated List of sanctioned people. They plead to act

against him. Moreover, the UN has decided not to center its efforts on catching Kony but rather by reintegrating and giving resources to the victims. In 2016 decided to extend more sanctions to the LRA because of their doings in the Central African Republic and specify that they are working closely with the RCI-LRA in efforts of restoring peace. What they have not mentioned what the sanctions are or how they are implementing these sanctions. (United Nations Security Council, 2021) (United Nations Security Council, 2021).

3.3 The LRA and the consequences of decades of violence

After three decades since the creation of the Lord's Resistance Army, the consequences of their doings have been enormous. First, the number of abducted children in these thirty-five years has been **at least** 60,000 children. Second, the human toll is estimated to be more than half a million people that have been murdered. Besides, the Acholi, the ethnic group that the LRA vowed to defend, has been the most affected by this group; at least 50% of its members have been abducted at least once, and 90% of the clan lives in Internally Displaced People -IDP- camps. The government has left them abandoned in these camps: they live in insanitary conditions, there is no access to clean water or electricity, they live in tents, the children have left their education. More than two and a half million IDPs are around the five countries where this terrorist organization acts.

Moreover, even if they live there to have a sense of security, they are still victims of LRA attacks inside these camps. The number of people that have been victims of their mutilations and other non-lethal attacks is unknown. The people who live outside do not have it that much better, and the governments have not focused their efforts on building hospitals and schools so the people's quality of life would improve. Despite the million dollars donated to these countries

because of this cause, this is not reflected on the people. There are specialized centers of reintegration for victims or abducted people coming back to society, but these programs have a short-term goal, on an average of two weeks; for young mothers, the programs last about six weeks. Even with the UN and the RCI-LRA's proclamations of restitution and victims' compensation, this is still to be seen. That can be due to two factors: the corruption of Museveni's government that will hold power until at least 2025 and/or the fact that the initiatives are using most of the sum of money for their operations in hopes of catching Kony. (Amnesty International, 2008) (Auletta-Young, Maclin, Kelly, & Cragin, 2015) (Chatlani, 2007).

Up until now, in 2021, Joseph Kony is still at large and continues with his rampant activities.

This chapter aimed to establish the Lord's Resistance Army's actions to be considered a terrorist organization (1990-2018). In the first part of the chapter, one studied the transition of the LRA from a guerrilla group to a terrorist organization, explaining the differences between guerrilla warfare and terrorism are. The first part of the chapter focuses on the role of the GoS for the continuous existence of the LRA by being their financial backbone for almost a decade. Afterward, one explained the Nairobi Agreement between the governments of Uganda and Sudan, so they would stop interfering in each countries conflicts and the promise of stopping the financial, logistical, and intelligence support for the LRA. Then, we analyzed this group's activities to prove if they are a terrorist organization or not under the definition of Schmid and the Academic Consensus. That gave us a tow to explain the ICC case against the top leadership, Kony et al., the first case for this court. The following subchapter focuses on some of the biggest actors in the international community -the United States, the European Union, the African Union, the United Nations- regarding their definitions of terrorism and how they have classified it under

their explanations. The final part of this chapter gave us an insight into the estimated amount of people affected by this group.

VI. ANALYSIS

This thesis paper had the general objective of describing the development and evolution of the Lord's Resistance Army from an ethnic defense group to a terrorist organization from a constructivist perspective. To prove the hypothesis that the group Lord's Resistance Army can be considered as a terrorist organization by the fundamental that it has committed crimes against humanity as a result of a deconstructed identity from an Acholi defense group to an extremist organization, one used the theoretical framework of Constructivism by Nicholas Onuf (1989), Alexander Wendt (1992), John Ruggie (1998) and Christian Reus-Smit (1999). To establish the creation and development of the said group, one must have an outlook on the country's complex history where it started, Uganda. This paper used historical and descriptive research methodology through secondary data and documents with a timeline approach (from the past towards the most recent events).

As determined, the modern history of the territory now known as Uganda began in the late 1800s with the British Empire's arrival. We start to study from this period onwards because of the foundations that this period will lay to create the Lord's Resistance Army. Onuf (1989) expresses that history is a recollection of moments and events that will shape our collective and individual identities and interests. In this scenario, we have two external factors that will affect the country's progress and its people, their colonizers, and religion. In the first place, we have the arrival of the Britons in the late 1800s. Since they began to rule the country, they would create an agency of division that will set the precedent that the following rulers would continue. They did so by giving unfair advantages to their allies of the Kingdom of Buganda and neglecting and violating the rest of the clans, only considering their interests but not those of the people of this land. Under their administration, they divided the territory into two parts, north and south,

because of their productivity. With more prosperous land and more developed livestock and agriculture, the south had to be able to feed and produce for the British, and as a result, they got a better education, healthcare, and roadwork. While the colonizers made the northern people believe they were superior, physically and intelligence-wise, to their southern counterparts because they needed the workforce and also because they needed trained men to fight for them, locally and later in World War II. That could be explained under Wendt's concept (1992) that one will change one's behavior to achieve their interests; the British said what they had to say to different people so the latter would follow what they needed at the time. The only people that were well during this period were the ones that hold power alongside the British. That will be a determining factor in the identity of these parts of the country, where both felt entitled to what the British made them believe. To this, one must add to the mixture the religious factor. Different religions -Jews, Muslims, Catholics, Christians- arrive at the place to spread their preaching; they went to different tribes to give their spiritual guidance. Although they belonged to different religions, they expressed how the locals were second-class humans brought from hell. Therefore, they needed their almighty God/Allah/Jehovah to be saved from this. Also, the British Empire left the task of education to these religious missions however they saw fit.

These deeds created a cycle in the construction of Ugandan society; first, whatever the white men said, it stuck with the Ugandan citizens as they were pushing a quasi-miracle by "*developing"* this nation. Second, they were educated that their religion was the only way to go, disputing the rest of the religions. Both these factors fall under the social communication concept, where our human nature drives us to adapt ourselves to our closest surroundings, giving legitimacy only to what we know. So, if the Acholi, Kony's clan, were taught by the Catholics, they saw Catholicism as the only valid religion. However, on the other hand, in the Kawka, Idi

Amin's clan, they were approached by the Muslims, making Amin a fervent Muslim and defending this religion no matter what.

After the independence, when Obote took power, he applied what he learned from the British, divide and conquer. So, what Dr. Milton Obote did was get allies -the Acholi that was similar to his clan -the Langi-, and these two tribes were the most privileged during this period. Nevertheless, he also decided to continue the negative perspective of diminishing the others as much as possible. At this point, under a constructivist perspective, Milton Obote could have reflected on how much the populations suffered under the British system and that he could purposefully change that and stop that. However, he made the conscious decision of not changing. Because of this solo decision, he opened the breach within the nation's tribes. During his first administration, the violence against the other 26 tribes was incommensurable, killings, lootings, military soldiers harassing civilians with their loaded guns.

When Idi Amin Dada seizes power through a c*oup d'état,* the violence increased because he decided to follow Obote's steps. For this period, one must analyze three things: power, the past, and religion. Regarding the first element, he knew that the only way he and his clan was to divide and conquer. Always with the winner-takes-all mentality. It is essential to point out that any of these men could have changed the pathway they were leading, but they **choose** not to. They preferred to continue a violent path and to try to eliminate all the others, especially the allies of his predecessor Obote -the Langi and the Acholi-. That happened because there is no Ugandan identity; every person identifies first as part of their tribe and then the nation; for example, Kony would first say "I am Acholi" before saying I am Ugandan.

Academics mention that this phenomenon could result from their relatively easy independence process, as the Ugandan people did not have to fight for it; it did not create that sense of nationality. This sense of belonging more to the tribe than the country impacted their identity values, meaning that they would put the interests of their closest people -clans- over the rest. Their actions and identities will be the development of these interests.

Once this territory started to work as an independent nation, Milton Obote, the first Prime Minister and consecutively the first president of the nation, replicated what he had learned in his lifetime: the only way to rule was to seize power and diminish the rest. Therefore, his armed forces (composed mainly of his tribe and their allies, the Acholi) started killing, looting, raping, and violently harassing the citizens. They did so because the institution they inherited was similar; Obote only took it a notch up. Moreover, this would continue with Idi Amin, the second Obote administration, and Yoweri Museveni, who has been in power for almost four decades since 1986. An important detail to consider is that in each administration, the level of violence would increase. Reus-Smit studies this under the infinite cycle between agents and agencies, and the agent will shape the agency that will shape the next agent and so on, as demonstrated in Figure #1. Thus, this created an us-versus-the-rest culture of violence where the only way to have **power, wealth, and security** was by being at the top and pushing down the rest. That added to the lack of national unity results from a Hobbesian type of personality, driven by egoism and power: one must execute one's enemies because otherwise they will execute oneself and take what one is "entitled" to.

Furthermore, this type of culture still persists in Uganda because of its history and the culture it created. We also have to mix religion because the Ugandan cycle is a mixture of both. i.e., Amin wanted an all-black Muslim country because he developed hatred towards the British

because of how they treated him and his tribe during their presence. Why Muslim country? Because of how they were taught about religion, saying that that specific religion was the only way to be saved. Thus, no leader has been able to deconstruct and change this institution into something that is towards the general well-being, and they do not want to do that because they would share their power and "make them weaker."

These twenty years of violence perpetuated by and against the Acholi caused small guerrillas and, subsequently, Joseph Kony with his Lord's Resistance Army. Joseph Kony was born around the same time when Uganda got independence and lived his whole life the highs and lows of being in and out of power. Thus, he was taught that the only means to get power, wealth, and security were in power. So, the LRA -as an ethnic defense group- wanted to protect their clan members because of Museveni's UPDF attacks against the Acholi, but also get to power as means of protection and stability for his people -the tribe- **but also** to spread his religious thoughts.

With that, the matter starts to become more and more complex because of his Christian religious beliefs that were mixed with traditional Acholi beliefs, where he claimed he was possessed by the Holy Spirit and other types of *Tipu Maleng*, and these claimed for the cleansing of the dirty ones, which were those that did not accept the Christian beliefs and started to abduct children as workforce and soldiers, which was a common technique in the area but not at the amount that Kony did.

So, here is when we can see the identity construction of an ethnic defense group and the fight for their initial objective, however when the GoS offered the LRA's leadership money, weapons, and intelligence, they saw that as an excellent opportunity to get power, security, and wealth.

Thus, they shifted the identity and interests of the group to guerrilla warfare because that was what the GoS needed. Could they have been considered terrorists at this time? No, because their violent acts had a purpose, to weaken the Sudanese rebels, and they abducted children to get more soldiers to fight in the frontline. The final identity shift comes after the Nairobi Agreement's signature because they no longer have an ally that could provide the power, security, and wealth they needed. So, **as means of survival**, they changed their identity to a terrorist organization. So then, their violent actions had the goal of causing terror to the general population. Therefore, all their actions were focused on causing fright so nobody would come after them, giving them enough time and resources for their survival.

Schmid (2011) analyses terrorism more as a psychological act than the violent act itself. The problem with the terrorism definition of the countries/organizations studied in the third chapter is that they only express terrorism as a violent act. However, Schmid argues that **not all violence** can be considered terrorist because it is the constant state of fright why the terrorist acts are successful, because of the message the act sent. Moreover, that is what the LRA used as their central resource, the psychological fright of the communities, and to have a better chance of survival, they expanded themselves with the same logic. The more people feared them, the lesser chance of people/governments going after them. Since the year 2000 -the year one could consider them terrorists-, through their variety of violent actions -mutilations, mass-murders, rapes, bomb/grenade attacks- they have achieved their goal of survival. Even with the intervention of great powers, such as the US, the EU, the UN, the AU, the ICC, and other NGO entities, they have been undefeated. That could result from the same terrorist attacks because people -that generally would be the ones to alert the authorities- prefer to stay quiet in fear of

retaliation. Therefore, the LRA will still exist until people lose the fear and are willing to notify the authorities.

Nevertheless, it is essential to point out how the international community has reacted to this group. They have only proposed the traditional justice system to capture Kony/Otti and get them to prison, but this approach has been less than fruitful as they continue with the violent doings. They -Kony and Otti-, for their side **will not stop** because they know the only way to protect their lives is if the LRA -as a group- survives. No other pacific or negotiation methods have been tried that might bring an end to this conflict.

As it can be seen through the second and third chapter, it is not only that this terrorist organization is violent, but the entire history of this country was and continues to be violent, to the point where one might talk about state terrorism; however, this topic would need more profound research through other authors. This idea will be further explained in the recommendations.

Finally, methodology-wise, this dissertation fulfilled its objectives through historical, descriptive research. However, there was a significant limitation regarding a lack of factual data to provide an actual number of victims -murders, mutilations-, abductions, IDPs, among others. In this paper, one expressed approximated numbers that different authors or organizations gave. However, these numbers are uneven, such as the number of abductees that some authors mention as 10,000 and the UN or other entities mention around 100,000.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The hypothesis for this dissertation paper was to prove if Lord's Resistance Army can be considered a terrorist organization by the fundamental that it has committed crimes against humanity as a result of a deconstructed identity from an Acholi defense group to an extremist organization. Hence, after analyzing this topic in-depth, by fulfilling the specific objectives of each chapter, one could consider the hypothesis as proven true. Thus, the conclusions that one could draw for this paper are:

- The British colonization had a divide-and-conquer perspective that never allowed the country to have a collective identity; the internal and external borders only drove the people away from what they had known for centuries, their clans. The crowns' interests only created an enormous gap between the north and the south, making them believe they were superior to their counterparts. Thus, the Ugandans began an eternal seek for power, and when they got this, they did everything in their hands to make the rest of the tribes feel inferior and diminish them of their humanity through violence.

- Since the Ugandan independence, this country's identity has been only controlled by violence; entire generations have been victims of this infinite cycle, no matter if the ruler was part of one tribe or another. They had the same methods to retain power: to keep their allies close and happy and make the rest of the people fear them. No president has changed that, from Obote to Amin, to Obote -once again- to Museveni. The democratic history of Uganda has been nothing else than a curtain; the citizens have never been able to choose whom they want to preside in the country.

- The Amin administration is the one that affected Acholi the most. During that era, Kony was born, and he experienced his clans' bloodshed when he was an infant. That is the period that inflicted the fear and the need for protection within the Acholi. However, when Obote returned to power, they put that aside and began to abuse the rest of the clans as they have done before. That turns around once again when Museveni gets to power.

- Joseph Kony was raised in an environment of violence, grasping the concept that having power was the only way to live, protect himself and his clan, and survive. The religious aspect of his upbringing also plays an essential role in his identity construction, not only Catholicism but the Acholi native spirituality, where it was normal for people to be possessed by *Malengs*.

- The creation of the Lord's Resistance Army has one explicit role and one implicit one. The former being the protection of the Acholi against the UPDF. The latter was the search for power, wealth, and security. They will adapt their identity as much as needed to get these three. When the GoS offers them money, intelligence, and support, they did not hesitate to take the chance.

- The Lord's Resistance Army is indeed a collateral result of the Ugandan colonization and political history.

- The LRA must be considered terrorists because of their crimes against humanity from the year 2000 onwards. Before that period, it can be considered either a rebel group or a guerrilla. One explicitly mentions this year because that is the year when the GoS removes their support, and the LRA actions result from their quest for survival. Regarding the international actors, they began to consider the LRA as terrorists as early as 2001 (the United

States), 2009 (the African Union), or 2011 (the European Union). As it was previously studied, the UN does not define people or groups as terrorists. However, the LRA and Joseph Kony have been discussed in the UN Security Council and added to their sanctions list since 2010. Yoweri Museveni's government has never classified the LRA as terrorists but rather as an insurgency or a rebel group; the motive behind this is to back up his speeches throughout the years that they are not that big of a threat to the community, taking away the *importance* of the LRA attacks and disguising the UPDF's failed military operations. Since 2007, Museveni stated the LRA was **no longer** a threat to the community; nevertheless, the GoU is still part of the RCI-LRA.

- There is hypocrisy from the government of Museveni, as they claim the LRA is no longer a threat. However, they continue to receive big lumps of money to finish this group, and the money destined for the victims has never gotten into the victims' hands.

- The international actors had done a partial job. The initiatives have been good, but they only donate money to the affected countries to solve it, even though they have mentioned they do not have the infrastructure, intelligence, or financial means to fight the LRA.

- The traditional justice system, either from the countries, the ICC, or the multiple initiatives, has not effectively fought this group. The more successful proposals have been negotiations or pacific methods such as Uganda's Amnesty Act of 2000 or the UN program of DDR.

- After circa thirty-five years of existence, and despite the acts of initiation that the abductees had to suffer, inside the camps, a community has been created because the children had no one outside -as they had to kill their families first- and created a sense of belonging inside the LRA, another reason why the group has not seized to exist.

- The victims have been left alone. Despite the proposed programs for reintegration and compensation, they have not gotten those. That could -and should- be classified as a humanitarian crisis under the UN definition of natural or **man-made** disasters that affect a population. This conflict could be one of these years-long attacks, thousands of victims that have not been compensated, *and* the region's governments or authorities cannot cope with these to provide wellbeing -health, education, safe water, sanitization- to the direct or indirect victims. Thus, this could come as complementary as the Ugandan government has been relying on international donations for many decades as their main economic activity. Moreover, the UN Charter (1945) mentions that all international actors' responsibility is to help these countries achieve solutions so the regions/countries can overcome what they cannot do independently.

- Related to the constructivist theory that one employed to achieve the objectives, it was helpful because of how the objectives were established; however, one only focuses on constructing the identity, interest, social relations, and structures. Nevertheless, this topic studied through this lens had its limitation, such as possible conflict resolutions, or could also be studied through a conflict and power strategy or taking another perspective of possible conflict resolutions for this case.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

After having written this paper, one recommends:

- For the government of Uganda to retrieve their words that the Lord's Resistance Army is no longer a threat.

- For the Congolese government to recognize that the LRA is still a threat.

- For the RCI-LRA, to better allocate their resources, because they are meant for the people, but the people are not receiving them. There must be a clear focalization of the available funds for the victims, limiting other operations or personnel, and they should present how they are expending their resources.

- To the academic community, to study the Ugandan history from a state terrorism perspective, from every governmental period since Amin's dictatorship (1971-1979), Obote's government (1980-1986), and Museveni's administration (1986-2021). Each of these periods should be studied not only as part of a conflict but to find out if there was/is state terrorism because Ugandan history has not yet been studied through this lens as state terrorism is *relatively* new. The leading authors of this topic are Peter Sproat (2008), who studies this subject from the core to determine if a state can be a terrorist. Steve Hewitt (2018) studies state terrorism with a combination of historical events and analysis as he states that terrorism by a state is still terrorism. State terrorism has some differences from "standard" non-state terrorism. Therefore, it has to be studied and addressed in different ways.

- For the international community, to put the Ugandan, Congolese, Central African, Sudanese, and South Sudanese people as a priority for reparations and compensations as they are not

receiving the aid they should. These countries cannot currently take care of their affected citizens, and the quality of life of the survivors -and in general- in these countries is worsening.

- To the regional and international community, to approach different negotiation methods with the LRA, hoping this conflict ends, as traditional justice has not been able to "end" this group.

- Because there is a lack of precise factual data, extensive on-field quantitative research must take place in these countries to have a more accurate number.

- This paper was centered -for academic reasons- on the LRA leadership; however, this topic also needs a perspective centered on the victims and survivors of this group.

- This topic should also be studied through different lenses centered on the conflict itself, such as the Classical Realism theory, the Power and Conflict theory by Peter T. Coleman (2000), or the Social Conflict theory by Lewis A. Coser. However, it is also crucial to analyze the conflict to define possible conflict resolutions through Peace and Conflict studies.

IX. LIST OF REFERENCES

Abe, D. (2014, June 3). *Josef Kony (1961?-)/Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).* Retrieved from Black Past: https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/kony-josef-1961-lord-s-resistance-army-lra/

Adyanga, O. C. (2011). *Modes of British imperial control of Africa: A case study of Uganda, c.1890-1990.* Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. doi:1-4438-2882-3

African Union Peace and Security. (2015). *The African Union-Led Regional Task Force for the elimination of the LRA.* African Union Peace and Security. Retrieved from https://www.peaceau.org/en/page/100-au-led-rci-lra-1

Al Jazeera. (2021, May 12). Uganda's President Museveni takes oath to kick off his sixth term. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/5/12/ugandas-president-museveni-sworn-in-for-sixth-term

Allen, T. (2006). *Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army.* London: Zed Books. Retrieved from https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/trial-justice-9781842777374/

Allen-Ebrahimian, B. (2017, April 21). U.S. Will Keep Fighting Lord's Resistance Army After All. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/21/u-s-will-keep-fighting-lords-resistance-army-after-all/

Amnesty International. (2008). *Left to their own devices: The continued suffering of victims of the conflict in Northern Uganda and the needs of reparations.* London: Amnesty International. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/52000/afr590092008en.pdf

Amone, C., & Muura, O. (2013). British Colonialism and the Creation of Acholi Ethnic Identity in Uganda, 1894 to 1962. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 42*(2), 239-257. doi:10.1080/03086534.2013.851844

Arieff, A., Ploch Blanchard, L., & Husted, T. F. (2015). *The Lord's Resistance Army: The U.S. Response.* Congressional Research Service. Washington: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42094.pdf

Atkinson, R. R. (2009). *From Uganda to the Congo and Beyond: Pursuing the Lord's Resistance Army.* New York: International Peace Institute. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09604.1

Atkinson, R. R., Lacaille, G., Cakaj, L., & Lancaster, P. (2012). Do no harm: assessing a military approach to the Lord's Resistance Army. *Journal of Eastern African Studies, 6*(2), 371-382. doi:10.1080/17531055.2012.669591

Auletta-Young, C., Maclin, B., Kelly, J., & Cragin, W. (2015). *We Mobilized Ourselves: Community Resilience in Areas Impacted by the Lord's Resistance Army.* Harvard Humanitarian Initiative; Harvard School of Public Health. Cambridge: Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. Retrieved from https://hhi.harvard.edu/files/humanitarianinitiative/files/hhi_lra_report_we_mobilized_ourselves.pdf?m=1610139782

Bevan, J. (2007). The Myth of Madness: Cold Rationality and 'Resource' Plunder by the Lord's Resistance Army. *Civil Wars, 9*(4), 343-358. doi:10.1080/13698240701699433

Byrnes, R. M., Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division & Thomas Leiper Kane Collection. (1992). *Uganda: A Country Study.* Washington, District of Columbia, United

States of America: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. Retrieved from https://www.loc.gov/resource/frdcstdy.ugandacountrystu00byrn_0/?st=gallery

Campbell, R. K. (1980). *Uganda: Developments since Amin.* Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved from https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Uganda_-_Developments_Since_Amin.pdf

Council of the European Union. (2001). *Proposal for a Council framework Decision on combating terrorism.* Brussels: Official Journal of the European Communities. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52001PC0521:EN:HTML#:~:text=At%20European%20Union%20level%2C%20Article,authorities%20and%20other%20competent%20authorities%2C

Council of the European Union. (2005). *The European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy.* Brussels: Council of the European Union. Retrieved from https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204/EN/pdf

Council of the European Union. (2012). *Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union: EU supports Joint Operations Centre to combat Kony's Lord's Resistance Army.* Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union. Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/129645.pdf

Council of the European Union. (2014). *New EU support to increase security in the Central African region.* Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_14_322

Council of the European Union. (2016). *Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/354.* Brussels: Official Journal of the European Union. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0354&from=EN

Chatlani, H. (2007). Uganda: A nation in crisis. *California Western International Law Journal, 37*(2), 277-298. Retrieved from https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol37/iss2/4/

Decker, A. (2010). Idi Amin's Dirty War: Subversion, Sabotage, and the Battle to Keep Uganda Clean, 1971-1979. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 43*(3), 489-513. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/23046822

Dinwiddy, H. (1983). The Ugandan Army and Makerere under Obote, 1962-71. *African Affairs, 82*(326), 43-59. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/721477

Dubal, S. (2018). *Against Humanity: Lessons from the Lord's Resistance Army.* Oakland, California: University of California. doi:https://lccn.loc.gov/2017033917

Dunn, K. C. (2004, March). Uganda: The Lord's Resistance Army. *Review of African Political Economy, 31*(99), 139-142. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/4006946

Ehrenreich, R. (1998). The Stories We Must Tell: Ugandan Children and the Atrocities of the Lord's Resistance Army. *Africa Today, 45*(1), 79-102. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/4187208

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d). *Terrorism.* Retrieved from Federal Bureau of Investigation: What we investigate: https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism

Feldman, R. L. (2008). Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's. *Defense & Security Analysis, 24*(1), 45-52. doi:10.1080/14751790801903210

Fiber, P. (2017). *Sources of Resilience in the Lord's Resistance Army.* CNA, Department of the Navy. Arlington: CNA. Retrieved from https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2017-U-015265-Final.pdf

Focus Economics. (2020, November 20). *Uganda Economic Outlook.* Retrieved from Focus Economics: https://www.focus-economics.com/countries/uganda

Gartrell, B. (1983). British Administrators, Colonial Chiefs, and the Comfort of Tradition: An Example from Uganda. *African Studies Review, 26*(1), 1-24. doi:10.2307/524608

Glentworth, G., & Hancock, I. (1973). Obote and Amin: Change and Continuity in Modern Uganda Politics. *African Affairs, 72*(288), 237-255. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/719846

Gordon, R. G. (2005). *Ethnologue: Languages of the World,* (15 ed.). Dallas, Texas, USA: SIL International. Retrieved from https://www.ethnologue.com/country/Uganda

Happold, M. (2007). The International Criminal Court and the Lord's Resistance Army. *Melbourne Journal of International Law, 8*(1). Retrieved from http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJIL/2007/7.html

Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. (2010). *IJR Uganda Country Profile.* Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Retrieved from http://www.ijr.org.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/IJR-Uganda-Profile_Greater-Horn-May-2010.pdf

International Criminal Court. (2018). *Case Information Sheet: Joseph Kony et Vincent Otti.* The Hague: International Criminal Court.

International Criminal Court. (2021). *The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen: Decision on the sentence in the Ongwen case at the ICC.* The Hague: International Criminal Court.

Retrieved from https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/210506-ongwen-sentence-faq-eng.pdf

International Criminal Court. (2021). *The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen: Verdict in the Ongwen trial at the ICC.* The Hague: International Criminal Court. Retrieved from https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/ongwen-verdict/qandq-ongwen-verdict-eng.pdf

International Criminal Court. (n.d). *Ongwen Case.* Retrieved from International Criminal Court: https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/ongwen

Invisible Children & USAID. (n.d). *Mapping violence in Central Africa*. Retrieved from Crisis Tracker: https://crisistracker.org/

Invisible Children. (n.d). *The Warlord: Joseph Kony.* Retrieved from Invisible Children: https://invisiblechildren.com/challenge/kony/

Jackson, P. (2010). *Politics, Religion and the Lord'sResistance Army in Northern Uganda.* University of Birmingham, Religions, and Development. Birmingham: University of Birmingham. doi:0 7044 2782 6

Kanyeihamba, G. (2010). *Constitutional and Political History of Uganda: From 1894 to Present.* Kampala, Uganda: LawAfrica Publishing (U) Ltd. doi:9966-7448-0-0

Kasozi, A. (1994). *Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, 1964-1985.* Québec, Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press. doi:9780773564879

Kelly, J., & Branham, L. (2013). *"We Suffer From War and More War": An Assessment of the Impact of the Lord's Resistance Army on Formerly Abducted Children and their Communities in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.* Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. Retrieved from https://hhi.harvard.edu/publications/we-suffer-war-and-more-war-assessment-impact-lords-resistance

Kisekka-Ntale, F., & Doro, E. (2014, December). Modes of Democratic Expressions Revisited: The Youth and the Politics of Defiance in Uganda. *Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, 7*(2), 1-14. Retrieved from http://www.apcj.upeace.org/issues/APCJ_Vol_7.2_Dec2014_Final_Web.pdf

Kony et al. Case, ICC-02/04-01/05 (International Crime Court December 3, 2003). Retrieved from International Crime Court: https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony

Kreimer, A.; World Bank. (2000). *Uganda: Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Country Case Evaluation.* Washington, District of Columbia: World Bank Publications. doi:0-8213-4682-2

Leonard, E. (2010, December). The Lord's Resistance Army an African Terrorist Group? *Perspectives on Terrorism, 4*(6), 20.30. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298492

Matti, S. (2012). In Pursuit of the Lord's Resistance Army: How to Deter Illegal Resource Extraction by Ugandan Forces. *Africa Today, 59*(1), 27-41. doi:10.2979/africatoday.59.1.27

Moghadam, A. (2015, 22 1). *The interplay between terrorism, insurgency, and civil war in the Middle East.* Retrieved from Fundación Real Instituto Elcano: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/terrorismo+internacional/ari4-2015-moghadam-interplay-between-terrorism-insurgency-and-civil-war-middle-east

Moody's Analytics. (2021). *Uganda - Economic Indicators.* Retrieved from Moody's Analytics: https://www.economy.com/uganda/indicators

Nayenga, P. F. (1979). Myths and Realities of Idi Amin Dada's Uganda. *African Studies Review, 22*(2), 127-138. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/523817

Ochan, C. (2009). *Assessing Uganda's cross-border pursuit of the Lord's Resistance Army.* Feinstein International Center. Tufts University. Retrieved from https://fic.tufts.edu/wp-content/uploads/Clement_Assessing_Uganda-2009.pdf

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (n.d, n.d n.d). *What are human rights?* Retrieved from Ohchr: https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx

Okeke, J. (2019). *Repositioning the AU's role in counter-terrorism operations.* Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved from https://media.africaportal.org/documents/Repositioning_the_AUs_role_in_counter_terrorism.pdf

Onuf, N. (1989). *World of Our Making.* Columbia, South Carolina, USA: University of South Carolina Press. doi:978-0-415-63039-9

Organization of African Unity. (2004). *Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.* Organization of African Unity. Retrieved from https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37291-treaty-0030_-_protocol_to_the_oau_convention_on_the_prevention_and_combating_of_terrorism_e.pdf

Organization of African Unity. (2015). *Silencing the Guns: Terrorism, mediation and non-state armed groups.* Organization of African Unity. Windhoek: Organisation of African Unity. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Windhoek-AU.pdf

Oxford Martin School; Our World in Data. (n.d). *Uganda.* Retrieved from Our World in Data: https://ourworldindata.org/country/uganda

Pham, P., Vinck, P., & Stover, E. (2007). *Abducted: The Lord's Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda.* Berkeley-Tulane Initiative on Vulnerable Populations. Berkeley: Human Rights Center University of California, Berkeley & Payson Center for International Development Tulane University. Retrieved from https://hhi.harvard.edu/files/humanitarianinitiative/files/abducted-the-lords-resistance-army.pdf?m=1614972341

Pham, P., Vinck, P., & Stover, E. (2007). *Abducted: The Lord's Resistance Army and Forced Conscription in Northern Uganda.* Harvard Humanitarian Initiative. Retrieved from https://hhi.harvard.edu/files/humanitarianinitiative/files/abducted-the-lords-resistance-army.pdf?m=1614972341

Reus-Smit, C. (1999). *The Moral Purpose of the State.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. doi:0-691-02735-8

Ruggie, J. G. (1998). *Constructing the World Polity.* (U. o. Warwick, Ed.) London: Routledge. doi:0-203-42426-3

Saul, B. (2021, June). *The Legal Black Hole in United Nations Counterterrorism.* Retrieved from Global Observatory: https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/06/the-legal-black-hole-in-united-nations-counterterrorism/

Saul, J. S. (1976). The Unsteady State: Uganda, Obote and General Amin. *Review of African Political Economy, 5*, 12-38. doi:https://www.jstor.org/stable/3997806

Saul, J. S. (1976). The Unsteady State: Uganda, Obote and General Amin. *Review of African Political Economy, 5*, 12-38. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3997806

Schmid, A. (2011). *The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* (1 ed.). New York, New York, USA: Routledge. DOI: 0-203-82873-9

Schomerus, M. (2012). ”They forget what they came for”: Uganda's army in Sudan. *Journal of Eastern African Studies, 6*(1), 124-153. doi:10.1080/17531055.2012.664707

Short, P. (1971). Amin's Uganda. *Transition, 40*, 48-55. Retrieved from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2934129

Statista. (2021). *Uganda: Average age of the population from 1950 to 2050.* Retrieved from Statista: https://www.statista.com/statistics/447643/average-age-of-the-population-in-uganda/

Summers, C., & Sikainga, A. A. (2015). Ugandan Politics World War II (1939-1949). In C. A. Judith A. Byfield (Ed.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=history-faculty-publications

Tamer, C. (2017, September 25). *The Differences Between the Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism.* Retrieved from Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Research: https://www.ankasam.org/en/the-differences-between-the-guerrilla-warfare-and-terrorism/

Tesemma, S. T. (2013, September). The Role of Cultist Religion in the Ugandan Civil Wars. *Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, 6*(2), 60-74. Retrieved from http://www.apcj.upeace.org/issues/APCJ_Vol_6.2_Dec2013_Final_Version_web.pdf

The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, ICC-02/04-01/05 (International Crime Court September 10, 2015). Retrieved from https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_16201.PDF

The World Factbook. (2014). *Uganda: History.* Retrieved from Transforming Uganda: http://transforminguganda.org/uganda

U.S. Government. (2009). *Crimes and Criminal Procedure: Chapter 113B- Terrorism.* Retrieved from Government Information: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2009-title18/html/USCODE-2009-title18-partI-chap113B-sec2331.htm

United Nations. (1948). *Universal Declaration of Human Rights.* Retrieved from United Nations: un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre. (2018). *UNCCT: An international centre to fight terrorism.* Retrieved from UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT): https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/cct/background

United Nations Peacemaker. (1999). *Agreement between the Governments of Sudan and Uganda, 8 December 1999: "The Nairobi Agreement."* Nairobi: United Nations Peacemaker. Retrieved from https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD%20UG_991208_Nairobi%20Agreement.pdf

United Nations Security Council. (2021). *Lord's Resistance Army.* Retrieved from United Nations Security Council: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2127/materials/summaries/entity/lord%E2%80%99s-resistance-army

United Nations Security Council. (2021). *United Nations Security Council Consolidated List.* Retrieved from United Nations Security Council Sanctions: https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop?xml=htdocs/resources/xml/en/consolidated.xml&xslt=htdocs/resources/xsl/en/consolidated.xsl

Van Acker, F. (2004). Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army: The New Order No One Ordered. *African Affairs, 103*(412), 335-357. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518561

Vinci, A. (2005). The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord's Resistance Army. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 16*(1), 360-381. doi:10.1080/09592310500221336

Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. *International Organization, 46*(2), 391-425. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858

Wertheim, P. (2003). Should "Grave Crimes of International Terrorism" be included in the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court? *Policy and Society, 22*(2), 1-21. doi:10.1016/S1449-4035(03)70017-4

World Peace Foundation. (2015). *AU Regional Task Force Against the Lord's Resistance Army.* Middlesex County: Tuffts University. Retrieved from https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/Lords-Resistance-Army-Mission.pdf

World Peace Foundation. (2015). *Uganda: 2nd Obote Regime.* Medford: Tufts University. Retrieved from https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/uganda-idi-amin-milton-obote-and-the-national-resistance-movement/